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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

JANE DOE, individually and on  
behalf of others similarly situated,

*Plaintiff,*

v.

THE COUNTY OF SANTA  
CLARA d/b/a SANTA CLARA  
VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER

*Defendants.*

CASE No. 3:23-cv-04411-WHO

**THIRD AMENDED CLASS  
ACTION COMPLAINT AND  
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

CASE No. 3:23-cv-04411-WHO

1 Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of all other current California  
2 citizens similarly situated, brings suit against Defendants the County of Santa Clara d/b/a Santa  
3 Clara Valley Medical Center (“Santa Clara Valley Medical Center” or “Santa Clara”), and upon  
4 personal knowledge as to Plaintiff’s own conduct and on information and belief as to all other  
5 matters based upon investigation by counsel, alleges as follows:

### 6 **I. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS**

7  
8 1. This case arises from Defendants’ systematic violation of the medical privacy  
9 rights of patients and users of Defendant Santa Clara Valley Medical Center’s services, exposing  
10 highly sensitive personal information to Facebook without those patients’ or users’ knowledge or  
11 consent.

12 2. At all relevant times, Santa Clara Valley Medical Center disclosed information  
13 about prospective and actual patients—including their status as actual or potential patients, their  
14 actual or potential physicians, their actual or potential medical treatments, the hospitals they  
15 visited or may visit, and their personal identities—to Facebook, as well as Google and other third  
16 parties without their prospective or actual patients’ knowledge, authorization, or consent.

17 3. Santa Clara disclosed this protected health information through the deployment of  
18 various digital marketing and automatic software tools embedded in its website that purposefully  
19 and intentionally disclose Personal Health Information to Facebook, as well as Google and other  
20 third parties who exploit that information for advertising purposes. Santa Clara’s use of these tools  
21 caused personally identifiable information and the contents of communications exchanged  
22 between actual and prospective patients with Santa Clara to be automatically redirected to  
23 Facebook, as well as Google and other third parties, in violation of those patients’ reasonable  
24 expectations of privacy, their rights as patients, and their rights as citizens of California.

25 4. Santa Clara’s conduct in disclosing such protected health information to Facebook  
26 and Facebook’s conduct in intercepting and exploiting the protected health information violate  
27 California law, including the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), CAL. PENAL CODE §§

630, et seq.; the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (“CMIA”), CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 56.06, 56.10, 56.101; and the Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (“CDAFA”), CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.

5. Plaintiff continues to desire to search for health information on Santa Clara’s websites as it is often her only means to seek and facilitate treatment. Plaintiff will continue to suffer harm if the websites are not redesigned. If the websites were redesigned to comply with applicable laws, Plaintiff would use Santa Clara’s websites to search for health information in the future.

6. On behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons, Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining Defendants from further unauthorized disclosures of personal information; awarding statutory damages as allowed under law; actual damages; attorney’s fees and costs; and granting any other preliminary or equitable relief the Court deems appropriate.

## II. PARTIES

### A. Plaintiff

7. Plaintiff Jane Doe is a resident of Santa Clara County, California.

8. Plaintiff Jane Doe has used Santa Clara Valley Medical Center’s website and patient portal to search for doctors and medical treatment and to manage her treatment.

9. Plaintiff Jane Doe’s use of the Santa Clara Valley Medical Center’s website entailed providing her sensitive medical information, such as conditions for which she was seeking treatment.

### B. Defendant

10. Defendant County of Santa Clara is the managing agent for Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, which has its principal place of business at 751 S. Bascom Avenue, San Jose, CA 95128. Santa Clara Valley Medical Center operates multiple hospitals and clinics, including Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, O’Connor Hospital, St. Louise Regional Hospital, Valley Health Center San Jose, Valley Health Center Sunnyvale, Valley Health Center Gilroy, and Valley

1 Health Center Milpitas.<sup>1</sup> Santa Clara also owns and operates both a website and patient portal for  
2 its patients, which can be accessed at <https://scvmc.scvh.org/home>. Defendant Meta Platforms,  
3 Inc. is a publicly traded Delaware corporation, headquartered in Menlo Park, California, which  
4 does business throughout the United States.

### 5 **III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

6 11. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness  
7 Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds \$5  
8 million, exclusive of interest and costs, there are more than 100 putative class members, and at  
9 least one Class Member is a citizen of a different state from Defendants.

10 12. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Santa Clara Valley Medical  
11 Center because it regularly conducts business throughout California, including in Santa Clara  
12 County, and has its principal place of business in California.

13 13. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Meta because Meta has sufficient  
14 minimum contacts with this District in that it is headquartered in this District and operates and  
15 markets its services in this District.

16 14. Venue is appropriate in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because  
17 Defendants reside in this district and because a substantial portion of the events and omissions  
18 giving rise to the claims occurred in this District.

### 19 **IV. COMPLIANCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS ACT**

20 15. Prior to filing this complaint, Plaintiff complied with the government tort claims  
21 process set forth in Cal. Gov. Code §§ 810-996.6, et seq.

22 16. On June 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a written claim for damages against Defendant  
23 County of Santa Clara, asserting the privacy claims that are the subject of this lawsuit.

24 17. On August 4, 2023, counsel for Defendant County of Santa Clara provided a  
25 Notice of Rejection of Claim letter to Plaintiff rejecting Plaintiff's claims.  
26

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27 <sup>1</sup> <https://scvmc.scvh.org/home>

## V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

18. Santa Clara Valley Medical Center's website and patient portal allows patients like Plaintiff to facilitate all aspects of their care with Santa Clara, allowing them to find doctors, research treatments, access medical records, pay bills, access its patient portal, view lab results, and refill prescriptions. Since 2018, Plaintiff has used Santa Clara's website and patient portal (Santa Clara's "Web Properties") for those purposes.

19. Plaintiff is a longtime Facebook user, who has had an account with Facebook since 2009.

20. Plaintiff has been a patient of Santa Clara Valley Medical Center since 2017. Plaintiff has regularly visited Santa Clara Valley Medical Center's website and patient portal since 2018 at <https://scvmc.scvh.org>. She used Santa Clara's website typically once a month to search for treatments for her conditions, including cirrhosis of liver and ascites, generalized anxiety disorder, migraines, and carpal tunnel syndrome. That research revealed treatments and tests for those conditions and others, including psychiatric treatment, physical therapy, and pain management.

21. Plaintiff has been using the Santa Clara Valley patient portal since 2017. Plaintiff has used the patient portal to access her lab results, schedule doctor's appointments, refill prescriptions, and communicate with her doctors. During her interactions inside the patient portal, Plaintiff entered sensitive medical information relating to her endometriosis, pelvic floor disorder, and menopause issues into the patient portal. On information and belief, Santa Clara installed tracking pixels inside its patient portal that surreptitiously forward patient interactions to third parties, including Google. Every time that Plaintiff interacted with Santa Clara's patient portal, Santa Clara caused her sensitive medical information to be shared with third parties, including information such as her IP address and browser fingerprint that could be used to personally identify her.

1           22. Plaintiff has also used Santa Clara's patient portal to make appointments with a  
2           gynecologist for treatment related to endometriosis, pelvic floor disorder, and menopause issues.  
3           On information and belief, whenever Plaintiff made such appointments, tracking pixels inside the  
4           portal caused details about those appointments to be shared with third parties, including Google.

5           23. Plaintiff has also used Santa Clara's website and patient portal to make  
6           appointments with a psychologist for treatment related to post-traumatic stress disorder, panic  
7           attacks, and a personality disorder.


8           24. Plaintiff has also used Santa Clara's website to order medications for women's  
9           health issues, including endometriosis, as well as for pancreatitis, asthma, fibromyalgia, and pain  
10          management.

11          25. Between January 1, 2023, and June 30, 2023, Plaintiff used Santa Clara's patient  
12          portal to view test results regarding testing for undiagnosed seizures, as well as bone density scans,  
13          scans related to arthritis, an endoscopy, an ultrasound of her liver, and an MRI of her brain.

14          26. In June 2023, Plaintiff used the "Find a Provider" function on Santa Clara's  
15          website to locate a neurologist.

16          27. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff Jane Doe, Santa Clara had embedded source code on its  
17          website that took every search term she entered and every page of the site she visited and sent that  
18          information directly to Facebook and Google, the largest and most profitable social media  
19          companies on the planet. Santa Clara accomplished this by installing Facebook's "Meta Pixel"  
20          tool and Google's Google Analytics pixel on almost every page of Santa Clara Valley Medical  
21          Center's website. These tracking tools worked like a listening device. Each time Plaintiff Jane  
22          Doe typed a search term, these tracking pixels recorded the information she entered and  
23          transmitted it to Facebook and Google, along with identifying information that let Facebook and  
24          Google know exactly who Jane Doe was and the conditions for which Plaintiff was seeking  
25          medical treatment.

28. For example, Santa Clara installed tracking pixels on the search box it makes available to patients on its website:




29. Plaintiff used the search box on the Santa Clara website to research her medical conditions, investigate treatment options, and locate doctors. Examples of the searches that Plaintiff ran using the Santa Clara search box, include “neurologist,” “Dr. Nimesh Shah,” “OBGYN,” “endometriosis,” and “cervical uterine cancer.” Every time that Plaintiff used the search box on Santa Clara’s website, Santa Clara transmitted these search terms to Facebook and Google, along with other data that personally identified Plaintiff, such as her IP address, browser fingerprint, and Facebook ID.

30. Santa Clara also installed tracking pixels on the “MYHEALTH ONLINE” button on its webpage that patients like Plaintiff used to navigate to the patient portal:



31. Plaintiff clicked on the “MYHEALTH ONLINE” button every time that she used the Santa Clara website to navigate to the patient portal. When she did, Santa Clara surreptitiously sent information to Facebook and Google confirming Plaintiff’s patient status, including additional information such as her IP address, Facebook ID, and browser fingerprint that allowed Facebook and Google to identify her.

32. Santa Clara also installed tracking pixels on the navigation button to the login page for its patient portal, located at <https://myhealthonline.sccgov.org/mychartprd/Authentication/Login?>



33. Plaintiff visited this page and clicked on the login button every time that she accessed the Santa Clara patient portal. Every time that she visited the patient portal page, Santa Clara surreptitiously transmitted information about Plaintiff to Facebook and Google, including personally identifying information. Every time that Plaintiff clicked on the login button to the patient portal, Santa Clara surreptitiously confirmed Plaintiff's patient status to Google, along with personally identifying information such as her IP address and browser fingerprint.

34. Likewise, once inside the patient portal, Plaintiff used the messaging functionality inside the portal to send and receive emails from her doctors. The messages that Plaintiff sent and received included information about Plaintiffs' sensitive medical issues, including treatment for a broken foot, cancer, blood work, OBGY/women's health issues, and scheduling surgeries with her gastrointestinal doctor. On information and belief, Santa Clara shared details about these communications with Facebook and Google, including details that permitted Facebook and Google to personally identify her.

35. Santa Clara also offers a mobile app for download to the public via its website



1 located at <https://myhealthonline.sccgov.org/mychartprd/Authentication/Login>. Santa Clara  
2 incorporated Google Firebase Code into the mobile patient portal app that it offered the public.

3 36. Google Firebase Code is a free software development kit (“SDK”) that Google  
4 offers to developers to help them build and monetize mobile applications. Google, however, uses  
5 this embedded code to surveil users on non-Google apps. Software libraries included within the  
6 Firebase SDK code enable Google to collect information such as a user’s age bracket, gender,  
7 interests, device brand, device category, location, operating system, and other information  
8 regarding users’ interactions with the app. Google Firebase code also allows Google to track text  
9 that users type into an app; track results of users’ searches within an app; and track users’  
10 downloads of files within an app. Unbeknownst to patients, the installation of this code inside  
11 the Santa Clara patient portal app resulted in disclosures of patients’ personal health information,  
12 including their patient status, whenever they logged into the app and used it for routine purposes  
13 such as reviewing medical records, checking lab results, and communicating with their doctors.

14 37. Facebook took the information it received via the Meta Pixel and added it to all  
15 of the other information it keeps about consumers, matching Plaintiff’s interest in medical care  
16 with her Facebook profile, name, address, interests, and other websites she had visited. This  
17 information then became available for Facebook’s advertisers to use when Facebook sold them  
18 targeted advertising services.

19 38. After using Santa Clara’s patient portal and website, Plaintiff saw numerous  
20 advertisements in her Facebook feed for products and services related to the medical conditions  
21 for which she had entered data inside the patient portal, including advertisements for pain  
22 management. These advertisements included advertisements for medications for her various  
23 conditions, as well as solicitations to participate in research questionnaires, research studies, and  
24 clinical trials.

25 39. Plaintiff was surprised and troubled that information she believed she was  
26 communicating only to Santa Clara Valley Medical Center for the purpose of obtaining medical  
27

1 treatment had been sent to Facebook, as well as Google and other third parties. Plaintiff  
2 subsequently learned that thousands of Santa Clara's patients had similarly had their privacy  
3 rights violated. Most of these patients were likely not even aware of this privacy violation, much  
4 less able to hire counsel to stop the illegal conduct. Plaintiff therefore now brings these claims to  
5 correct Defendants' privacy violations and obtain relief for herself and thousands of similarly  
6 situated patients.

## 7 VI. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

### 8 A. Santa Clara routinely disclosed the protected health information of patients and users 9 of their services to Facebook.

10 40. Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution provides: "All people are by  
11 nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending  
12 life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,  
13 happiness, and privacy." California Constitution, Article I, Section 1.

14 41. Medical patients and those seeking medical treatment in California such as  
15 Plaintiff have a legal interest in preserving the confidentiality of their communications with health  
16 care providers and have reasonable expectations of privacy that their personally identifiable  
17 information and communications will not be disclosed to third parties by Santa Clara Valley  
18 Medical Center without their express written consent and authorization.

19 42. As a health care provider, Santa Clara Valley Medical Center has common-law  
20 and statutory duties to keep patient data, communications, diagnoses, and treatment information  
21 completely confidential unless authorized to make disclosures by the patient.

22 43. Patients are aware of (and must be able to rely upon) the protections, obligations,  
23 and expectations provided by statutory, regulatory, and common law as well as the promises of  
24 confidentiality contained within the Hippocratic Oath.

25 44. Santa Clara Valley Medical Center operates websites for current and prospective  
26 patients, including <https://scvmc.scvh.org>.

1           45. Santa Clara's Web Properties are designed for interactive communication with  
2 patients, including scheduling appointments, searching for physicians, paying bills, requesting  
3 medical records, learning about medical issues and treatment options, and joining support groups.

4           46. Santa Clara encourages patients to use digital tools on its websites to seek and  
5 receive health care services.

6           47. The home page of Santa Clara Valley Medical Center's website is designed for use  
7 by patients. The homepage provides patients with tools to seek medical treatment, such as finding  
8 a doctor, researching services and treatments, and paying bills.

9           48. Santa Clara also maintains a patient portal, which allows patients to make  
10 appointments, access medical records, view lab results, and exchange communications with health  
11 care providers. On information and belief, source code on Santa Clara Valley Medical Center's  
12 website caused these communications to be intercepted and disclosed to multiple third parties.

13           49. Santa Clara encourages patients to use digital tools on its websites to seek and  
14 receive health care services. Plaintiff and Class Members provided their private information to  
15 Santa Clara's website with the reasonable understanding that Santa Clara would secure and  
16 preserve the confidentiality of that information.

17           50. Plaintiff and Class Members exchanged numerous communications with Santa  
18 Clara Valley Medical Center. Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications included logging  
19 in and out of patient portals, exchanging communications about doctors and health conditions,  
20 and using button functionality from Santa Clara's websites.

21           51. Notwithstanding prospective and current patients' reasonable expectations of  
22 privacy and Santa Clara's legal duties of confidentiality Santa Clara disclosed (and continues to  
23 disclose) the contents of Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications and protected health  
24 information via automatic tracking mechanisms embedded in the websites operated by Santa  
25 Clara without patients' knowledge, authorization, or consent. In doing so, Santa Clara  
26 systematically violated the medical privacy rights of Plaintiff and Class Members by causing the  
27

1 unauthorized disclosure of their communications to be transmitted to Facebook, as well as Google  
2 and other third-party marketing companies.

3 52. The private information provided by Plaintiff and Class Members has been—and  
4 likely will be—further disseminated to additional third parties.

5 53. While Santa Clara intentionally incorporated the Meta Pixel into its website, Santa  
6 Clara never disclosed to Plaintiff or Class Members that it shared their sensitive and confidential  
7 communications with Facebook. As a result, Plaintiff and Class Members were unaware that their  
8 private information was being surreptitiously transmitted to third parties, including Facebook,  
9 when they visited Santa Clara’s website.

10 54. By design, none of the tracking mechanisms employed by Santa Clara are visible  
11 to patients visiting Santa Clara’s website.

12 55. Santa Clara did not warn or otherwise disclose to Plaintiff and Class Members that  
13 Santa Clara bartered their confidential medical communications to Facebook, as well as Google  
14 and other third parties, for marketing purposes.

15 56. Plaintiff and Class Members never consented, agreed, or otherwise authorized  
16 Santa Clara to disclose their confidential medical communications.

17 57. Upon information and belief, Santa Clara disclosed and Facebook intercepted the  
18 following non-public private information:

- 19 a. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ status as patients;  
20 b. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ communications with Santa Clara via its website;  
21 c. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ use of Santa Clara’s patient portal;  
22 d. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ searches for information regarding specific medical  
23 conditions and treatments, their medical providers, and their physical location.  
24

25 58. Santa Clara interfered with Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ privacy rights when it  
26 implemented technology that surreptitiously tracked, recorded, and disclosed Plaintiff’s and Class  
27 Members’ confidential information to Facebook, as well as Google and other third parties.

1           59. Santa Clara also breached its obligations to patients in multiple other ways,  
2 including (1) failing to obtain their consent to disclose their private information to Facebook and  
3 other third parties, (2) failing to adequately review its marketing programs and web-based  
4 technology to ensure its website was safe and secure, (3) failing to remove or disengage software  
5 code that was known and designed to share patients' private information with third parties,  
6 (4) failing to take steps to block the transmission of Plaintiff's and Class Members' private  
7 information to Facebook and other third-party advertising companies, (5) failing to warn Plaintiff  
8 and Class Members that Santa Clara was routinely bartering their private information to Facebook  
9 via the Meta Pixel, and (6) otherwise ignoring Santa Clara's common-law and statutory  
10 obligations to protect the confidentiality of patient's protected health information.

11           60. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered injury because of Defendants' conduct.  
12 Their injuries include invasion of privacy and the continued and ongoing risk of irreparable harm  
13 from the disclosure of their most sensitive and personal information.

14 **B. The Nature of Santa Clara's Unauthorized Disclosure of Patients' Health Care**  
15 **Information**

16           61. Santa Clara's disclosure of current and prospective patients' personal health  
17 information occurs because Santa Clara intentionally deploys source code on the websites it  
18 operates, which causes current and prospective patients' personally identifiable information (as  
19 well as the exact contents of their communications) to be transmitted to Facebook and other third  
20 parties. The only purpose for deploying this source code was to share data about patients with  
21 Facebook and Google so that Santa Clara could obtain analytics and marketing benefits from  
22 those companies.

23           62. By design, Facebook and other third parties receive and record the exact contents  
24 of these communications before the full response from Santa Clara has been rendered on the  
25 screen of the patient's or user's computer device and while the communication with Santa Clara  
26 remains ongoing.

1           63. While the information captured and disclosed without permission may vary  
2 depending on the pixel(s) embedded, these “data packets” can be extensive, sending, for example,  
3 not just the name of a physician and field of medicine, but also the first name, the last name, email  
4 address, phone number and zip code and city of residence entered into the booking form. In  
5 addition, that data is linked to a specific internet protocol (“IP”) address.

6           64. The only reason for installing tracking pixels on a website is so that a web host  
7 like Santa Clara can share information with third parties like Facebook and Google. Tracking  
8 pixels are designed to automatically share user information with third parties every time they are  
9 triggered.

10          65. The Meta Pixel, for example, sends information to Facebook via scripts running in  
11 a person’s internet browser so each data packet comes labeled with an IP address that can be used  
12 in combination with other data to identify an individual or household.

13          66. In addition, if the person is (or recently has) logged into Facebook when they visit  
14 a particular website when a Meta Pixel is installed, some browsers will attach third-party  
15 cookies—another tracking mechanism—that allow Meta to link pixel data to specific Facebook  
16 accounts.

17          67. The Meta Pixel allows Facebook to track people and the actions they take on  
18 websites. When Meta Pixel is installed on a hospital website or patient portal like those  
19 maintained by Santa Clara, the information that Facebook receives may include such information  
20 as the patient’s home address, their name, their search location, as well as their doctor’s specialty,  
21 name, and gender. When combined with other information that Facebook receives via the Meta  
22 Pixel (such as Plaintiff’s appointment information and information about the kinds of treatments  
23 that patients research on the hospital’s website), Facebook learns about patients’ past and future  
24 medical conditions, their past and future medical treatment, and when and where they are  
25 receiving treatment for those conditions.

1           68. With substantial work and technical know-how, internet users can sometimes  
2 circumvent this browser-based wiretap technology. This is why third parties bent on gathering  
3 Personal Health Information, like Facebook, implement workarounds that cannot be evaded by  
4 savvy users. Facebook's workaround is called Conversions API (CAPI).

5           69. CAPI is an effective workaround because it does not intercept data communicated  
6 from the user's browser. Instead, Conversions API "is designed to create a direct connection  
7 between [Web hosts'] marketing data and [Facebook]."

8           70. Communications between patients and hospital websites, using Conversions API  
9 are received by hospitals and stored on their servers before CAPI collects and sends the Personal  
10 Health Information contained in those communications directly from the hospitals to Facebook.  
11 Client devices do not have access to host servers and thus cannot prevent (or even detect) this  
12 transmission.

13           71. While there is no way to confirm with certainty that a Web host like Santa Clara  
14 has implemented workarounds like CAPI without access to the host server, Facebook instructs  
15 companies to use the CAPI in addition to the Pixel and share the same events using both tools  
16 because such a redundant event setup allows website owners to share website events with  
17 Facebook that the pixel may lose. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that Facebook's customers who  
18 implement the Meta Pixel in accordance with Facebook's documentation will also implement the  
19 CAPI workaround.

20           72. The third parties to whom a website transmits data through pixels and associated  
21 workarounds do not provide any substantive content relating to the user's communications.  
22 Instead, these third parties are typically procured to track user data and communications for  
23 marketing purposes of the website owner.

24           73. Thus, without any knowledge, authorization, or action by a user, a website owner  
25 like Santa Clara can use its source code to commandeer a user's computing device, causing the  
26 device to contemporaneously and invisibly re-direct the users' communications to Facebook.  
27

1           74. For example, when Plaintiff or a Class Member accessed Santa Clara's website  
2 pages hosting the Meta Pixel, the Meta Pixel software directed their browsers to send a message  
3 to Facebook's servers. The information that Santa Clara sent to Facebook included the private  
4 information that Plaintiff and Class Members communicated to Santa Clara's website, such as the  
5 type of medical appointment the patient made, the date, and the specific doctor the patient was  
6 seeing. Such private information allows Facebook to determine that a specific patient was seeking  
7 a specific type of confidential medical treatment. This kind of disclosure also allows Facebook  
8 to reasonably infer that a specific patient was being treated for specific types of medical  
9 conditions, such as cancer.

10           75. Websites like those maintained by Santa Clara are hosted by a computer server  
11 through which the businesses in charge of the website exchange and communicate with internet  
12 users via their web browsers.

13           76. Every website is hosted by a computer server through which the entity in charge  
14 of the website exchanges communications with internet users via a client device, such as a  
15 computer, tablet, or smart phone, via the client device's web browser.

16           77. Web browsers are software applications that allow users to exchange electronic  
17 communications over the internet.

18           78. Each exchange of an electronic communication over the internet consists of an  
19 HTTP request from a client device and an HTTP response from a server. When a user types a  
20 URL into a web browser, for example, the URL is sent as an HTTP request to the server  
21 corresponding to the web address, and the server then returns an HTTP response that consists of  
22 a web page to render in the client device's web browser.


23           79. In addition to specifying the URL, HTTP requests can also send data to the host  
24 server, including users' cookies. Cookies are text files stored on client devices to record data,  
25 often containing sensitive, personally identifiable information.



80. In turn, HTTP responses may consist, among other things, of a web page, another kind of file, text information, or error codes.

81. A web page consists primarily of “Markup” and “Source Code.” The markup of a web page comprises the visible portion of that web page. Markup is displayed by a web browser in the form of words, paragraphs, images, and videos displayed on a users’ device screen. The source code of a web page is a set of instructions that commands the browser to take certain actions, either when the web page loads or when a specified event triggers the code.

82. For example, typing <https://scvmc.scvh.org/home> into a web browser sends an http request to Santa Clara’s website, which returns a HTTP response in the form of the home page of Santa Clara’s website:



83. Source code is not visible on the client device’s screen, but it may change the markup of a webpage, thereby changing what is displayed on the client device’s screen. Source code may also execute a host of other programmatic instructions, including commanding a web browser to send data transmissions in the form of HTTP requests to the website’s server, or, as is the case with Santa Clara’s website, to third parties via pixels.

84. In addition to controlling a website’s Markup, Source Code executes a host of other programmatic instructions and can command a website visitor’s browser to send data

1 transmissions to third parties via pixels or web bugs,<sup>2</sup> effectively opening a spying window  
2 through which the webpage can funnel the visitor's data, actions, and communications to third  
3 parties, along with patients' personally identifiable information like their Facebook IDs.

4 85. For example, Santa Clara's website includes software code that transmits HTTP  
5 requests *directly* to Facebook, including patients' private health information, every time a patient  
6 interacts with a page on its website.

7 86. In essence, Santa Clara encourages its patients to use a tapped device, and once the  
8 Webpage is loaded into a patient's browser, the software-based wiretap is quietly waiting for  
9 private communications on the Webpage to trigger the tap, which intercepts those  
10 communications intended only for Santa Clara and transmits those communications to Facebook  
11 and other third parties.

12 87. When a patient communicates with Santa Clara's website (whether by typing in a  
13 webpage, putting in a search, clicking on a hyperlink, logging into the Santa Clara Valley Medical  
14 Center patient portal or otherwise), Santa Clara causes some of that information to be transmitted  
15 to Facebook, as well as Google and other third parties, without the patient's knowledge or  
16 authorization. The third parties to whom user data is transmitted and the content of  
17 communications redirected are typically procured by websites to track users' personally  
18 identifiable data and communications for marketing purposes—i.e., targeted advertising.

19 88. The basic command that web browsers use to exchange data and user  
20 communications is called a GET request.<sup>3</sup> For example, when a patient types "heart failure  
21 treatment" into the search box on Santa Clara's website and hits 'Enter,' the patient's web browser  
22 makes a connection with the server for Santa Clara's website and sends the following request:  
23 "GET search/q=heart+failure+treatment."

24  
25  
26 <sup>2</sup> These pixels or web bugs are tiny image files that are invisible to website users. They are purposefully  
27 designed in this manner, or camouflaged, so that users remain unaware of them.

<sup>3</sup> [https://www.w3schools.com/tags/ref\\_httpmethods.asp](https://www.w3schools.com/tags/ref_httpmethods.asp)

1           89.     The other basic transmission command utilized by web browsers is POST, which  
2 is typically employed when a user enters data into a form on a website and clicks 'Enter' or some  
3 other form of submission button. POST sends the data entered in the form to the server hosting  
4 the website that the user is visiting.

5           90.     In response to receiving a GET or POST request, the server for the entity with  
6 which the user is exchanging communications, in this case Santa Clara's server, will send a set of  
7 instructions to the web-browser, commanding the browser with source code that (1) directs the  
8 browser on how to render the entity's response and, in many circumstances, (2) commands the  
9 browser to transmit personally identifiable data about the Internet user and re-direct the precise  
10 content of the user's GET or POST requests to various third parties.

11           91.     Unbeknownst to most users, however, the website's server may also transmit the  
12 user's communications to Facebook, as well as other third parties. The Meta Pixel that Santa  
13 Clara installed on its website is programmed to manipulate user's browsers so that their  
14 communications with Santa Clara were automatically, contemporaneously, and surreptitiously  
15 sent to Facebook. When Plaintiff and Class Members visited Santa Clara's website for the first  
16 time, the Meta Pixel source code that Santa Clara had installed on its website instructed Plaintiff's  
17 and Class Members' browsers to begin sending duplicate GET and POST requests to Facebook  
18 every time that Plaintiff and Class Members subsequently interacted with part of Santa Clara's  
19 website, such as browsing new pages, filling out forms, or entering search terms in a search box.

20           92.     The Meta Pixel was triggered each time Plaintiff and Class Members  
21 communicated with Santa Clara via Santa Clara's website or navigated to Santa Clara's patient  
22 portal. This resulted in Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications being intercepted,  
23 duplicated, and secretly transmitted to Facebook at the same time the communications (in the  
24 form of HTTP GET requests and HTTP POST requests) were transmitted to Santa Clara.

25           93.     In other words, as a result of the source code that Santa Clara installed on its  
26 website, *two* communications originate from a patient's browser once the patient initiates an  
27

1 action on Santa Clara’s website—one (as intended) sent to Santa Clara and a second (undetectable  
2 to patients like Plaintiff and Class Members) that was simultaneously sent to Facebook.  
3 Accordingly, at the same time Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ browsers sent communications to  
4 Santa Clara, a duplicate of those communications was simultaneously sent to Facebook as a result  
5 of the instructions that their browsers had previously received from Santa Clara’s website.

6 94. Given that the two communications are literally generated and sent at the same  
7 time, the duplication is occurring while the intended communications are in transit. Effectively,  
8 it is as if Santa Clara planted a bugging device inside Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ telephones,  
9 so that when they placed a call, the bug simultaneously sent a radio signal to Facebook in the next  
10 room, allowing Facebook to listen in and record the call. In this way, Santa Clara aided Facebook  
11 to read, learn, and exploit the contents of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ communications that  
12 they sent (and Santa Clara received) within the state of California.

13 95. Google warns website developers and publishers that installing its ad tracking  
14 software on webpages employing GET requests will result in users’ personally identifiable  
15 information being disclosed to Google.<sup>4</sup>

16 96. Worse, the Personal Health Information that Santa Clara’s Meta Pixel sent to  
17 Facebook was sent alongside Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Facebook IDs (c\_user cookie or  
18 “FID”) thereby allowing individual patients’ communications with Santa Clara, and the Personal  
19 Health Information contained in those communications, to be linked to their unique Facebook  
20 accounts.

21 97. A user’s FID is linked to their Facebook profile, which generally contains a wide  
22 range of demographic and other information about the user, including pictures, personal interests,  
23 work history, relationship status, and other details. Because the user’s Facebook Profile ID  
24 uniquely identifies an individual’s Facebook account, Meta—or any ordinary person—can easily  
25  
26

27 <sup>4</sup> <https://support.google.com/platformspolicy/answer/6156630?hl=en>

1 use the Facebook Profile ID to quickly and easily locate, access, and view the user's  
2 corresponding Facebook profile.

3 98. Third parties (such as Facebook and Google) use the information they receive to  
4 track user data and communications for marketing purposes.

5 99. In many cases, third-party marketing companies acquire the content of user  
6 communications through a 1x1 pixel (the smallest dot on a user's screen) called a tracking pixel,  
7 a web-bug, or a web beacon. These tracking pixels are tiny and are purposefully camouflaged to  
8 remain invisible to users.

9 100. Web bugs can be placed directly on a page by a web developer or can be funneled  
10 through a "tag manager" service to make the invisible tracking run more efficiently and to further  
11 obscure the third parties to whom the website transmits personally identifiable user data and re-  
12 directs the content of communications.

13 101. On information and belief, Santa Clara deploys Google Tag Manager on its  
14 websites through an "iframe," a nested "frame" that exists within the Santa Clara's Web  
15 Properties, including inside Santa Clara's patient portal, that is, in reality, an invisible window  
16 through which Santa Clara funnels web bugs for third parties to secretly acquire the content of  
17 patient communications without any knowledge, consent, authorization, or further action of  
18 patients.

19 102. By design, none of the tracking is visible to patients who visit Santa Clara's Web  
20 Properties.

21 103. Once the initial connection is made between a user and a website, the  
22 communications commence and continue between the parties in a bilateral fashion until the user  
23 leaves the website.

24 104. Unbeknownst to most users, the website's server may also transmit the user's  
25 communications to third parties. Indeed, Google warns website developers and publishers that  
26  
27

1 installing its ad tracking software on webpages employing GET requests will result in users'  
2 personally identifiable information being disclosed to Google.<sup>5</sup>

3 105. Third parties (such as Facebook and Google) use the information they receive to  
4 track user data and communications for marketing purposes.

5 106. These tracking pixels can collect dozens of data points about individual website  
6 users who interact with a website. One of the world's most prevalent tracking pixels, called the  
7 Meta Pixel, is provided by Facebook.

8 107. A website developer who chooses to deploy third-party source code, like a tracking  
9 pixel, on their website must include the third-party source code directly in their website for every  
10 third party they wish to send user data and communications. This source code operates invisibly  
11 in the background when users visit a site employing such code.

12 108. More significantly, tracking pixels such as the Meta Pixel tool allow Santa Clara  
13 and Facebook to secretly track, intercept, record, and transmit every patient communication made  
14 on Santa Clara's website. When patients visit Santa Clara's website, unbeknownst to them, the  
15 web page displayed on the patient's browser includes the Meta Pixel as embedded code, which is  
16 not visible to patients or other visitors to Santa Clara's website. This code is triggered when a  
17 patient or visitor interacts with the web page. Each time the Meta Pixel is triggered, the software  
18 code is executed and sends patients' private information directly to Facebook.

19 109. The Meta Pixel and similar tracking pixels act like a physical wiretap on a phone.  
20 Like a physical wiretap, pixels do not appear to alter the function of the communication device  
21 on which they are surreptitiously installed. Instead, these pixels lie in wait until they are triggered  
22 by an event, at which time they effectively open a channel through the website that funnels data  
23 about users and their actions to third parties via a hidden HTTP request that is never shown to or  
24 agreed to by the user.

25  
26  
27 <sup>5</sup> <https://support.google.com/platformspolicy/answer/6156630?hl=en>

110. For example, a patient can trigger an HTTP request by interacting with the search bar on Santa Clara’s website by typing a term such as “pregnancy” into the search bar and then hitting enter. Santa Clara’s server in turn sends an HTTP response, which results in the search results being displayed.

111. This is not the only HTTP request, however, that is created by a patient’s interaction with Santa Clara’s website. In fact, at the very same time the web page is instructed to send an HTTP request to Santa Clara requesting search results, the source code, acting as a tap, is triggered, such that Santa Clara’s website is also instructed to send an HTTP request directly to Facebook, as well as Google, and other third parties, informing them of the patient’s exact search and the patient’s identifiable information.

**C. Tracking pixels provide third parties with a trove of personally identifiable information.**

112. Tracking pixels are especially pernicious because they result in the disclosure of personally identifiable information.

113. For example, an IP address is a number that identifies a computer connected to the internet. IP addresses are used to identify and route communications on the internet. IP addresses of individual users are used by internet service providers, websites, and tracking companies to facilitate and track internet communications and content. IP addresses also offer advertising companies like Facebook a unique and semi-persistent identifier across devices—one that has limited privacy controls.<sup>6</sup>

114. Because of their uniquely identifying character, IP addresses are considered protected personally identifiable information. 45 CFR § 164.514. Tracking pixels can (and typically do) collect website visitors’ IP addresses.

115. HIPAA further provides that information is personally identifiable where the covered entity has “actual knowledge that the information could be used alone or in combination

<sup>6</sup> <https://adtechexplained.com/the-future-of-ip-address-as-an-advertising-identifier/>

1 with other information to identify an individual who is a subject of the information.” 45 C.F.R. §  
2 164.514(2)(ii); *see also*, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(O).

3 116. Consequently, Santa Clara’s disclosure of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ IP  
4 addresses violated HIPAA and industry-wide privacy standards.

5 117. Likewise, internet cookies also provide personally identifiable information.

6 118. In the early years of the internet, advertising on websites followed the same model  
7 as traditional newspapers. Just as a sporting goods store would choose to advertise in the sports  
8 section of a traditional newspaper, advertisers on the early internet paid for ads to be placed on  
9 specific web pages based on the type of content displayed.

10 119. Computer programmers eventually developed ‘cookies’—small text files that web  
11 servers can place on a user’s browser and computer when a user’s browser interacts with a website  
12 server. Eventually some cookies were designed to acquire and record an individual internet user’s  
13 communications and activities on websites across the internet.

14 120. Cookies are designed to operate as a means of identification for internet users.  
15 Advertising companies like Facebook and Google have developed methods for monetizing and  
16 profiting from cookies. These companies use third-party tracking cookies to help them acquire  
17 and record user data and communications in order to sell targeted advertising that is customized  
18 to a user’s personal communications and browsing history. To build individual profiles of internet  
19 users, third party advertising companies assign each user a unique (or a set of unique) identifiers.

20 121. Cookies are considered personal identifiers. 45 CFR § 164.514. Tracking pixels  
21 can collect cookies from website visitors.

22 122. In general, cookies are categorized by (1) duration and (2) party.

23 123. There are two types of cookies classified by duration.

24 124. “Session cookies” are placed on a user’s computing device only while the user is  
25 navigating the website that placed and accesses the cookie. The user’s web browser typically  
26 deletes session cookies when the user closes the browser.



1           125. “Persistent cookies” are designed to survive beyond a single internet-browsing  
2 session. The party creating the persistent cookie determines its lifespan. As a result, a persistent  
3 cookie can acquire and record a user’s internet communications for years and over dozens or even  
4 hundreds of websites. Persistent cookies are also called “tracking cookies.”

5           126. Cookies are also classified by the party that uses the collected data.

6           127. “First-party cookies” are set on a user’s device by the website with which the user  
7 is exchanging communications. First-party cookies can be helpful to the user, server, and/or  
8 website to assist with security, login, and functionality.

9           128. “Third-party cookies” are set on a user’s device by website servers other than the  
10 website or server with which the user is exchanging communications. For example, the same  
11 patient who visits Santa Clara’s website will also have cookies on their device from third parties,  
12 such as Facebook and Google. Unlike first-party cookies, third-party cookies are not typically  
13 helpful to the user. Instead, third-party cookies are typically used for data collection, behavioral  
14 profiling, and targeted advertising.

15           129. Data companies like Facebook have developed methods for monetizing and  
16 profiting from cookies. These companies use third-party tracking cookies to help them acquire  
17 and record user data and communications in order to sell advertising that is customized to a user’s  
18 communications and habits. To build individual profiles of internet users, third party data  
19 companies assign each user a unique identifier or set of unique identifiers.

20           130. Traditionally, first-party and third-party cookies were kept separate. An internet  
21 security policy known as the same-origin policy required web browsers to prevent one web server  
22 from accessing the cookies of a separate web server. For example, although Santa Clara can  
23 deploy source code that uses Facebook third-party cookies to help Facebook acquire and record a  
24 patient’s communications, Santa Clara is not permitted direct access to Facebook third-party  
25 cookie values. The reverse *was* also true: Facebook was not provided direct access to the values  
26 associated with first-party cookies set by companies like Santa Clara. But Data companies have  
27

1 designed a way to hack around the same-origin policy so that third-party data companies like  
2 Facebook can gain access to first-party cookies.

3 131. JavaScript source code developed by third party data companies and placed on a  
4 webpage by a developer such as Santa Clara can bypass the same-origin policy to send a first-  
5 party cookie value in a tracking pixel to the third-party data company. This technique is known  
6 as “cookie synching,” and it allows two cooperating websites to learn each other’s cookie  
7 identification numbers for the same user. Once the cookie synching operation is completed, the  
8 two websites can exchange any information that they have collected and recorded about a user  
9 that is associated with a cookie identifier number. The technique can also be used to track an  
10 individual who has chosen to deploy third-party cookie blockers.

11 132. In effect, cookie synching is a method through which Facebook, Google, and other  
12 third-party marketing companies set and access third-party cookies that masquerade as first-party  
13 cookies. By designing these special third-party cookies that are set for first-party websites,  
14 Facebook and Google hack their way around any cookie blockers that users set up to stop their  
15 tracking.

16 133. The Facebook cookie used for cookie synching is named `_fbp`.

17 134. On information and belief, the letters `fbp` are an acronym for Facebook Pixel.

18 135. The Facebook `_fbp` cookie is a Facebook identifier that is set by Facebook source  
19 code and associated with the health care provider using the Meta Pixel.

20 136. The `_fbp` cookie is also a third-party cookie in that it is also a cookie associated  
21 with Facebook that is used by Facebook to associate information about a person and their  
22 communications with non-Facebook entities while the person is on a non-Facebook website or  
23 app.

24 137. Santa Clara requires patients using its patient portal to have enabled first-party  
25 cookies to gain access to its patient portal.

26 138. The `_fbp` cookie is used as a unique identifier for patients by Facebook.  
27  
28

1           139. If a patient takes an action to delete or clear third-party cookies from their device,  
2 the \_fbp cookie is not impacted—even though it is a Facebook cookie—because Facebook has  
3 disguised it as a first-party cookie. Facebook also uses IP addresses and user-agent information  
4 to match the health information it receives from Santa Clara with Facebook users.

5           140. Santa Clara engages in cookie synching with Facebook, as well as with Google  
6 and other third parties.

7           141. Santa Clara’s cookie disclosures include the deployment of cookie synching  
8 techniques that cause the disclosure of the first-party cookie values that Santa Clara assigns to  
9 patients to also be made to third parties.

10           142. Santa Clara uses and causes the disclosure of patient cookie identifiers with each  
11 re-directed communication described herein, including patient communications concerning  
12 individual providers, conditions, and treatments.

13           143. A third type of personally identifiable information is what data companies refer to  
14 as a “browser-fingerprint.” A browser-fingerprint is information collected about a computing  
15 device that can be used to identify the specific device.

16           144. These browser-fingerprints can be used to uniquely identify individual users when  
17 a computing device’s IP address is hidden or cookies are blocked and can provide a wide variety  
18 of data. As Google explained, “With fingerprinting, developers have found ways to use tiny bits  
19 of information that vary between users, such as what device they have or what fonts they have  
20 installed to generate a unique identifier which can then be used to match a user across websites.”<sup>7</sup>  
21 The value of browser-fingerprinting to advertisers (and trackers who want to monetize aggregated  
22 data) is that they can be used to track website users just as cookies do, but it employs much more  
23 subtle techniques.<sup>8</sup> Additionally, unlike cookies, users cannot clear their fingerprint and therefore  
24 cannot control how their personal information is collected.<sup>9</sup>

25  
26 <sup>7</sup> <https://www.blog.google/products/chrome/building-a-more-private-web/>

27 <sup>8</sup> <https://pixelprivacy.com/resources/browser-fingerprinting/>

28 <sup>9</sup> <https://www.blog.google/products/chrome/building-a-more-private-web/>

1           145. In 2017, researchers demonstrated that browser fingerprinting techniques can  
2 successfully identify 99.24 percent of all users.<sup>10</sup>

3           146. Browser-fingerprints are personal identifiers, and tracking pixels can collect  
4 browser-fingerprints from website visitors.

5           147. Santa Clara uses and causes the disclosure of data sufficient for third parties to  
6 create a browser-fingerprint identifier with each re-directed communication described herein,  
7 including patient communications concerning individual providers, conditions, and treatments.

8           148. A fourth kind of personally identifiable information protected by law against  
9 disclosure are unique user identifiers (such as Facebook's "Facebook ID") that permit companies  
10 like Facebook to quickly and automatically identify the personal identity of its user across the  
11 internet whenever the identifier is encountered. A Facebook ID is an identifying number string  
12 that is connected to a user's Facebook profile.<sup>11</sup> Anyone with access to a user's Facebook ID can  
13 locate a user's Facebook profile.<sup>12</sup>

14           149. Unique identifiers such as a person's Facebook ID are likewise capable of  
15 collection through pixel trackers.

16           150. Each of the individual data elements described above is personally identifiable on  
17 their own. However, Santa Clara's disclosures of such personally identifiable data elements do  
18 not occur in a vacuum. The disclosures of the different data elements are tied together and, when  
19 taken together, these data elements are even more accurate in identifying individual patients,  
20 particularly when disclosed to data companies such as Facebook, Google, and other internet  
21 marketing companies that expressly state that they use such data elements to identify individuals.

22  
23  
24  
25 <sup>10</sup> <https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2017/ndss-2017-programme/cross-browser-fingerprinting-os-and-hardware-level-features/>

26 <sup>11</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/help/211813265517027>

27 <sup>12</sup> <https://smallseotools.com/find-facebook-id/>

#### **D. Facebook’s Business Model: Exploiting Users’ Personal Information for Profit**

151. Facebook, a social media platform founded in 2004 and today operated by Meta Platforms, Inc., was originally designed as a social networking website for college students.

152. Facebook describes itself as a “real identity” platform.<sup>13</sup> This means that users are permitted only one account and must share “the name they go by in everyday life.”<sup>14</sup> To that end, Facebook requires users to provide their first and last name, along with their birthday, telephone number and/or email address, and gender, when creating an account.<sup>15</sup>

153. In 2007, realizing the value of having direct access to millions of consumers, Facebook began monetizing its platform by launching “Facebook Ads,” proclaiming this service to be a “completely new way of advertising online,” that would allow “advertisers to deliver more tailored and relevant ads.”<sup>16</sup> Facebook has since evolved into one of the largest advertising companies in the world.<sup>17</sup> Facebook can target users so effectively because it surveils user activity both on and off its website through the use of tracking pixels.<sup>18</sup> This allows Facebook to make inferences about users based on their interests, behavior, and connections.<sup>19</sup>

154. Today, Facebook provides advertising on its own social media platforms, as well as other websites through its Facebook Audience Network. Facebook has more than 2.9 billion users.<sup>20</sup>

155. Facebook maintains profiles on users that include users’ real names, locations, email addresses, friends, likes, and communications. These profiles are associated with personal

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-many-users-does-facebook-have-the-company-struggles-to-figure-it-out-11634846701#:~:text=Facebook%20said%20in%20its%20most,of%20them%20than%20developed%20ones.>

<sup>14</sup> <https://transparency.fb.com/policies/community-standards/account-integrity-and-authentic-identity/>

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/help/406644739431633>

<sup>16</sup> <https://about.fb.com/news/2007/11/facebook-unveils-facebook-ads/>

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/01/facts-about-americans-and-facebook/>

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/742478679120153?id=1205376682832142>

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting>

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/>

1 identifiers, including IP addresses, cookies, and other device identifiers. Facebook also tracks  
2 non-users across the web through its internet marketing products and source code.

3 156. Facebook offers several advertising options based on the type of audience that an  
4 advertiser wants to target. Those options include targeting “Core Audiences,” “Custom  
5 Audiences,” “Look Alike Audiences,” and even more granulated approaches within audiences  
6 called “Detailed Targeting.” Each of Facebook’s advertising tools allow an advertiser to target  
7 users based, among other things, on their personal data, including geographic location,  
8 demographics (e.g., age, gender, education, job title, etc.), interests, (e.g., preferred food, movies),  
9 connections (e.g., particular events or Facebook pages), and behaviors (e.g., purchases, device  
10 usage, and pages visited). This audience can be created by Facebook, the advertiser, or both  
11 working in conjunction.

12 157. Ad Targeting has been extremely successful due to Facebook’s ability to target  
13 individuals at a granular level. For example, among many possible target audiences, “Facebook  
14 offers advertisers 1.5 million people ‘whose activity on Facebook suggests that they’re more  
15 likely to engage with/distribute liberal political content’ and nearly seven million Facebook users  
16 who ‘prefer high-value goods in Mexico.’”<sup>21</sup> Aided by highly granular data used to target specific  
17 users, Facebook’s advertising segment quickly became Facebook’s most successful business unit,  
18 with millions of companies and individuals utilizing Facebook’s advertising services.

19 **E. Facebook’s Meta Pixel tool allows Facebook to track the personal data of individuals**  
20 **across a broad range of third-party websites.**

21 158. To power its advertising business, Facebook uses a variety of tracking tools to  
22 collect data about individuals, which it can then share with advertisers. These tools include  
23 software development kits incorporated into third-party applications, its “Like” and “Share”  
24 buttons (known as “social plug-ins”), and other methodologies, which it then uses to power its  
25 advertising business.

26 159. One of Facebook’s most powerful tools is called the “Meta Pixel.”

27 <sup>21</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html>

1           160. The Meta Pixel is a snippet of code embedded on a third-party website that tracks  
2 users' activities as users navigate through a website.<sup>22</sup> Once activated, the Meta Pixel "tracks the  
3 people and type of actions they take."<sup>23</sup> Meta Pixel can track and log each page a user visits, what  
4 buttons they click, as well as specific information that users input into a website.<sup>24</sup> The Meta Pixel  
5 code works by sending Facebook a detailed log of a user's interaction with a website such as  
6 clicking on a product or running a search via a query box. The Meta Pixel also captures  
7 information such as what content a user views on a website or how far down a web page they  
8 scrolled.<sup>25</sup>

9           161. When a patient uses their healthcare provider's website or application where the  
10 Meta Pixel is present, the Meta Pixel transmits the content of their communications to Facebook,  
11 including but not limited to (1) signing up for a patient portal, (2) signing-in and -out of a patient  
12 portal, (3) taking actions inside a patient portal, (4) making or scheduling appointments, (5)  
13 exchanging communications related to doctors, treatments, payment information, health  
14 insurance information, prescription drugs, prescriptions, side effects, conditions, diagnoses,  
15 prognoses, or symptoms of health conditions, (6) conduct a search on a Facebook partner website,  
16 and (7) other information that qualifies as Personal Health Information and/or Protected Health  
17 Information under state and federal laws.

18           162. In many circumstances, Facebook also obtains information from health care  
19 providers that identify a Facebook user's status as a patient and other health information that is  
20 protected by state and federal law. This occurs through tools that Facebook encourages health  
21 care providers to use to upload customer (i.e., patient) lists for use in its advertising systems.

22           163. The information transmitted from a health care provider's website or application  
23 is sufficient to uniquely identify a patient under federal law (such as IP addresses and device  
24

25 <sup>22</sup> <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/>

26 <sup>23</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/business/goals/retargeting>

27 <sup>24</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/742478679120153?id=1205376682832142>

28 <sup>25</sup> <https://themarkup.org/show-your-work/2022/04/28/how-we-built-a-meta-pixel-inspector>

1 identifiers that Facebook associates with a patient’s Facebook account), and may also include a  
2 patient’s demographic information, email address, phone number, computer IP address, contact  
3 information, appointment type and date, treating physicians, button and menu selections, the  
4 content of buttons clicked, information typed into text boxes, and information about the substance,  
5 purport, and meaning of patient requests for information from their health care providers.

6 164. When someone visits a third-party website page that includes the Meta Pixel code,  
7 the Meta Pixel code is able to replicate and send the user data to Facebook through a separate (but  
8 simultaneous) channel in a manner that is undetectable by the user.<sup>26</sup> This information is disclosed  
9 to Facebook regardless of whether a user is logged into their Facebook account at the time.

10 165. The transmission is instantaneous—indeed Facebook often receives the  
11 information before the health care provider does.

12 166. The transmission is invisible.

13 167. The transmission is made without any affirmative action taken by the patient.

14 168. The transmission occurs without any notice to the patient that it is occurring.

15 169. Facebook collects the transmitted identifiable health information and uses  
16 “cookies” to match it to Facebook users, allowing Facebook to target ads to a person who, for  
17 example, has used a patient portal and has exchanged communications about a specific condition,  
18 such as cancer.

19 170. The information Meta Pixel captures and discloses to Facebook includes a referrer  
20 header (or “URL”), which includes significant information regarding the user’s browsing history,  
21 including the identifiable information of the individual internet user and the web server, as well  
22 as the name of the web page and the search terms used to find it.<sup>27</sup> When users enter a URL  
23 address into their web browser using the ‘http’ web address format, or click hyperlinks embedded  
24 on a web page, they are actually telling their web browsers (the client) which resources to request  
25

26 <sup>26</sup> See, e.g., *In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation*, 956 F.3d 589, 596 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2020) (explaining  
functionality of Facebook software code on third-party websites).

27 <sup>27</sup> *In re Facebook*, 956 F.3d at 596.



1 and where to find them. Thus, the URL provides significant information regarding a user's  
2 browsing history, including identifiable information for the individual internet user and the web  
3 server, as well as the name of the web page and the search terms that the user used to find it.

4 171. These search terms and the resulting URLs divulge a user's personal interests,  
5 queries, and habits on third-party websites operating outside of Facebook's own platform. In this  
6 manner, Facebook tracks users' browsing histories on third-party websites and compiles these  
7 browsing histories into personal profiles which are sold to advertisers to generate revenue.<sup>28</sup>

8 172. For example, if the Meta Pixel is incorporated on a shopping website, it may log  
9 what searches a user performed, which items of clothing a user clicked on, whether they added an  
10 item to their cart, as well as what they purchased. Along with this data, Facebook also receives  
11 personally identifiable information like IP addresses, Facebook IDs, user agent information,  
12 device identifiers, and other data. All this personally identifiable data is available each time the  
13 Meta Pixel forwards a user's interactions with a third-party website to Facebook's servers. Once  
14 Facebook receives this information, Facebook processes it, analyzes it, and assimilates it into  
15 datasets like its Core Audiences and Custom Audiences. Facebook can then sell this information  
16 to companies who wish to display advertising for products similar to what the user looked at on  
17 the original shopping website.

18 173. These communications with Facebook happen silently, without users' knowledge.  
19 By default, the transmission of information to Facebook's servers is invisible. Facebook's Meta  
20 Pixel allows third-party websites to capture and send personal information a user provides to  
21 match them with Facebook or Instagram profiles, even if they are not logged into Facebook at the  
22 time.<sup>29</sup>

23  
24  
25  
26 <sup>28</sup> *In re Facebook*, 956 F.3d at 596.

27 <sup>29</sup> <https://themarkup.org/show-your-work/2022/04/28/how-we-built-a-meta-pixel-inspector>

1           174. In exchange for installing its Meta Pixel, Facebook provides website owners like  
 2 Santa Clara with analytics about the ads they have placed on Facebook and Instagram and tools  
 3 to target people who have visited its websites.<sup>30</sup>

4           175. The Meta Pixel collects data on website visitors regardless of whether they have  
 5 Facebook or Instagram accounts.<sup>31</sup>

6           176. Facebook can then share analytic metrics with the website host, while at the same  
 7 time sharing the information it collects with third-party advertisers who can then target users  
 8 based on the information collected and shared by Facebook.

9           177. Facebook touted Meta Pixel (which it originally called “Facebook Pixel”) as “a  
 10 new way to report and optimize for conversions, build audiences and get rich insights about how  
 11 people use your website.”<sup>32</sup> According to Facebook, the Meta Pixel is an analytics tool that allows  
 12 businesses to measure the effectiveness of their advertising by understanding the actions people  
 13 take on its websites.”<sup>33</sup>

14           178. Facebook warns web developers that its Pixel enables Facebook “to match your  
 15 website visitors to their respective Facebook User accounts.”<sup>34</sup>

16           179. Facebook recommends that its Meta Pixel code be added to the base code on every  
 17 website page (including the website’s persistent header) to reduce the chances of browsers or code  
 18 blocking Pixel’s execution and to ensure that visitors will be tracked.<sup>35</sup>

19           180. Once the Meta Pixel is installed on a business’s website, the Meta Pixel tracks  
 20 users as they navigate through the website and logs which pages are visited, which buttons are  
 21 clicked, the specific information entered in forms (including personal information), as well as  
 22

23 <sup>30</sup> <https://themarkup.org/pixel-hunt/2022/06/16/facebook-is-receiving-sensitive-medical-information-from-hospital-websites>

24 <sup>31</sup> <https://themarkup.org/show-your-work/2022/04/28/how-we-built-a-meta-pixel-inspector>

25 <sup>32</sup> <https://developers.facebook.com/ads/blog/post/v2/2015/10/14/announcing-facebook-pixel/>

26 <sup>33</sup> <https://www.oviond.com/understanding-the-facebook-pixel>

27 <sup>34</sup> <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/get-started>

28 <sup>35</sup> <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/get-started>

1 “optional values” set by the business website.<sup>36</sup> Facebook builds user profiles on users that  
2 include the user’s real name, address, location, email addresses, friends, likes, and  
3 communications that Facebook associates with personal identifiers, such as IP addresses and the  
4 Facebook ID. Meta Pixel tracks this data regardless of whether a user is logged into Facebook.

5 181. Facebook tracks non-Facebook users through its widespread internet marketing  
6 products and source code, and Mark Zuckerberg has conceded that the company maintains  
7 “shadow profiles” on nonusers of Facebook.<sup>37</sup>

8 182. For Facebook, the Meta Pixel tool embedded on third-party websites acts as a  
9 conduit for information, sending the information it collects to Facebook through scripts running  
10 in a user’s internet browser, similar to how a “bug” or wiretap can capture audio information. The  
11 information is sent in data packets, which include personally identifiable data.

12 183. For example, the Meta Pixel is configured to automatically collect “HTTP  
13 Headers” and “Pixel-specific data.”<sup>38</sup> HTTP headers collect data including “IP addresses,  
14 information about the web browser, page location, document, referrer and person using the  
15 website.”<sup>39</sup> Pixel-specific data includes such data as the “Pixel ID and the Facebook Cookie.”<sup>40</sup>

16 184. Meta Pixel takes the information it harvests and sends it to Facebook with  
17 personally identifiable information, such as a user’s IP address, name, email, phone number, and  
18 specific Facebook ID. Anyone who has access to this Facebook ID can use this identifier to  
19 quickly and easily locate, access, and view a user’s corresponding Facebook profile. Facebook  
20 stores this information on its servers, and, in some instances, maintains this information for  
21 years.<sup>41</sup>

22  
23 <sup>36</sup> <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/>

24 <sup>37</sup> <https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/11/facebook-shadow-profiles-hearing-lujan-zuckerberg/>

25 <sup>38</sup> <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/>

26 <sup>39</sup> <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/>

27 <sup>40</sup> <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/>

28 <sup>41</sup> <https://themarkup.org/pixel-hunt/2022/06/16/facebook-is-receiving-sensitive-medical-information-from-hospital-websites>

185. Facebook has a number of ways to exploit the data that is being forwarded from third-party websites through the Meta Pixel.

186. If a user has a Facebook account, the user data may be collected and linked to the individual user's Facebook account. For example, if the user is logged into their Facebook account when the user visits a third-party website where the Meta Pixel is installed, many common browsers will attach third-party cookies allowing Facebook to link the data collected by Meta Pixel to the specific Facebook user.

187. Alternatively, Facebook can link the data to a user's Facebook account through the "Facebook Cookie."<sup>42</sup> The Facebook Cookie is a workaround to recent cookie-blocking applications used to prevent websites from tracking users.<sup>43</sup>

188. Facebook can also link user data to Facebook accounts through identifying information collected through Meta Pixel through what Facebook calls "Advanced Matching." There are two forms of Advanced Matching: manual matching and automatic matching.<sup>44</sup> Manual matching requires the website developer to manually send data to Facebook so that users can be linked to data. Automatic matching allows Meta Pixel to scour the data it receives from third-party websites to search for recognizable fields, including names and email addresses that correspond with users' Facebook accounts.

189. While the Meta Pixel tool "hashes" personal data—obscuring it through a form of cryptography before sending the data to Facebook—that hashing does not prevent *Facebook* from using the data.<sup>45</sup> In fact, Facebook explicitly uses the hashed information it gathers to link pixel data to Facebook profiles.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> <https://clearcode.cc/blog/facebook-first-party-cookie-adtech/>

<sup>43</sup> <https://clearcode.cc/blog/difference-between-first-party-third-party-cookies/>

<sup>44</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/611774685654668?id=1205376682832142>

<sup>45</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/611774685654668?id=1205376682832142>

<sup>46</sup> <https://themarkup.org/pixel-hunt/2022/06/16/facebook-is-receiving-sensitive-medical-information-from-hospital-websites>

1           190. Facebook also receives personally identifiable information in the form of user's  
2 unique IP addresses, which remain the same as users visit multiple websites. When browsing a  
3 third-party website that has embedded Facebook code, a user's IP address is forwarded to  
4 Facebook by GET requests, which are triggered by Facebook code snippets. The IP address  
5 enables Facebook to keep track of the website page visits associated with that address.

6           191. Facebook also places cookies on visitors' computers. It then uses these cookies to  
7 store information about each user. For example, the "c\_user" cookie is a unique identifier that  
8 identifies a Facebook user's ID. The c\_user cookie value is a means of identification that is the  
9 Facebook equivalent of a user identification number. Each Facebook user has one—and only  
10 one—unique c\_user cookie. Facebook uses the c\_user cookie to record user activities and  
11 communications.

12           192. An unskilled computer user can obtain the c\_user value for any Facebook user by  
13 (1) going to the user's Facebook page, (2) right-clicking with their mouse anywhere on the  
14 background of the page, (3) selecting 'View page source,' (4) executing a control-F function for  
15 "user=" and (5) copying the number value that immediately follows "user=" in the page source  
16 code of the target Facebook user's page.

17           193. It is even easier to find the Facebook account associated with a c\_user cookie: one  
18 simply needs to log-in to Facebook, and then type www.facebook.com/#, with # representing the  
19 c\_user cookie identifier. For example, the c\_user cookie value for Mark Zuckerberg is 4. Logging  
20 in to Facebook and typing www.facebook.com/4 in the web browser retrieves Mark Zuckerberg's  
21 Facebook page: www.facebook.com/zuck.

22           194. The datr cookie identifies the patient's specific web browser from which the  
23 patient is sending the communication. It is an identifier that is unique to the patient's specific web  
24 browser and is therefore a means of identification for Facebook users. Facebook keeps a record  
25 of every datr cookie identifier associated with each of its users, and a Facebook user can obtain a  
26 redacted list of all datr cookies associated with his or her Facebook account from Facebook.

1           195. The fr cookie is a Facebook identifier that is an encrypted combination of the  
2 c\_user and datr cookies.

3           196. The fbp cookie is a Facebook identifier that is set by Facebook source code and  
4 associated with Santa Clara's use of the Facebook Tracking Pixel program.

5           197. The fbp cookie emanates from Santa Clara's Web Properties as a putative first-  
6 party cookie, but is transmitted to Facebook through cookie synching technology that hacks  
7 around the same-origin policy.

8           198. Similarly, the "lu" cookie identifies the last Facebook user who logged in using a  
9 specific browser. Like IP addresses, cookies are included with each request that a user's browser  
10 makes to Facebook's servers. Facebook employs similar cookies such as the "fr," "act,"  
11 "presence," "spin," "wd," "xs," and "fbp" cookies to track users on websites across the internet.<sup>47</sup>  
12 These cookies allow Facebook to easily link the browsing activity of its users to their real-world  
13 identities, and such highly sensitive data as medical information, religion, and political  
14 preferences.<sup>48</sup>

15           199. Facebook also uses browser fingerprinting to uniquely identify individuals. Web  
16 browsers have several attributes that vary between users, like the browser software system,  
17 plugins that have been installed, fonts that are available on the system, the size of the screen, color  
18 depth, and more. Together, these attributes create a fingerprint that is highly distinctive. The  
19 likelihood that two browsers have the same fingerprint is at least as low as 1 in 286,777, and the  
20 accuracy of the fingerprint increases when combined with cookies and the user's IP address.  
21 Facebook recognizes a visitor's browser fingerprint each time a Facebook button is loaded on a  
22 third-party website page. Using these various methods, Facebook can identify individual users,  
23 watch as they browse third-party websites like Santa Clara's website, and target users with  
24 advertising based on their web activity.

25  
26 <sup>47</sup> <https://techexpertise.medium.com/facebook-cookies-analysis-e1cf6ffbf8a#:~:text=browser%20session%20ends.-%E2%80%9Cdatr%E2%80%9D,security%20and%20site%20integrity%20features.>

27 <sup>48</sup> [https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/fb\\_tracking/fb\\_plugins.pdf](https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/fb_tracking/fb_plugins.pdf)

200. Facebook then sells advertising space by highlighting its ability to target users. Facebook can target users so effectively because it surveils user activity both on and off its official website. This allows Facebook to make inferences about users far beyond what they explicitly disclose, like their “interests,” “behavior,” and “connections.”<sup>49</sup> Facebook compiles this information into a generalized dataset called “Core Audiences,” which advertisers use to create highly specific targeted advertising. Indeed, Facebook uses precisely the type of Personal Health Information that Santa Clara bartered to Facebook so that Facebook can identify, target, and market products and services to individuals.

**F. Santa Clara has embedded the Meta Pixel tool on its website, resulting in the capture and disclosure of patients’ and users’ protected health information to Facebook.**

201. A third-party website that incorporates Meta Pixel benefits from the ability to analyze a user’s experience and activity on the website to assess the website’s functionality and traffic. The third-party website also gains information from its customers through Meta Pixel that can be used to target them with advertisements, as well as to measure the results of advertising efforts.

202. Facebook’s intrusion into the personal data of visitors to third-party websites incorporating the Meta Pixel is both significant and unprecedented. When Meta Pixel is incorporated into a third-party website, unbeknownst to users and without their consent, Facebook gains the ability to surreptitiously gather every user interaction with the website ranging from what the user clicks on to the personal information entered on a website search bar. Facebook aggregates this data against all websites.<sup>50</sup> Facebook benefits from obtaining this information because it improves its advertising network, including its machine-learning algorithms and its ability to identify and target users with ads.

203. Facebook provides websites using Meta Pixel with the data it captures in the “Meta Pixel page” in Events Manager, as well as tools and analytics to reach these individuals through

<sup>49</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting>

<sup>50</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/742478679120153?id=1205376682832142>

1 future Facebook ads.<sup>51</sup> For example, websites can use this data to create “custom audiences” to  
2 target the specific Facebook user, as well as other Facebook users who match “custom audience’s”  
3 criteria.<sup>52</sup> Businesses that use Meta Pixel can also search through Meta Pixel data to find specific  
4 types of users to target, such as men over a certain age.

5 204. Businesses install the Meta Pixel software code to help drive and decode key  
6 performance metrics from visitor traffic to their websites.<sup>53</sup> Businesses also use the Meta Pixel to  
7 build custom audiences on Facebook that can be used for advertising purposes.<sup>54</sup>

8 205. Recently, investigative journalists have determined that Meta Pixel is embedded  
9 on the websites of many of the top hospitals in the United States.<sup>55</sup> This results in sensitive medical  
10 information being collected and then sent to Facebook when a user interacts with these hospital  
11 websites.

12 206. For example, when a user on many of these hospital websites clicks on a “Schedule  
13 Online” button next to a doctor’s name, Meta Pixel sends the text of the button, the doctor’s name,  
14 and the search term (such as “cardiology”) used to find the doctor to Facebook. If the hospital’s  
15 website has a drop-down menu to select a medical condition in connection with locating a doctor  
16 or making an appointment, that condition is also transmitted to Facebook through Meta Pixel.

17 207. Facebook has designed the Meta Pixel such that Facebook receives information  
18 about patient activities on hospital websites as they occur in real time. Indeed, the moment that a  
19 patient takes any action on a webpage that includes the Meta Pixel—such as clicking a button to  
20 register, login, or logout of a patient portal or to create an appointment—Facebook code embedded  
21 on that page redirects the content of the patient’s communications to Facebook while the exchange  
22 of information between the patient and hospital is still occurring.

23  
24 <sup>51</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/742478679120153?id=1205376682832142>

25 <sup>52</sup> <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/reference/custom-audience/>

26 <sup>53</sup> <https://instapage.com/blog/meta-pixel>

27 <sup>54</sup> <https://instapage.com/blog/meta-pixel>

28 <sup>55</sup> <https://themarkup.org/pixel-hunt/2022/06/16/facebook-is-receiving-sensitive-medical-information-from-hospital-websites>



1           208. Santa Clara is among the hospital systems who have embedded Meta Pixel on their  
2 websites. Via its use of the Meta Pixel, Santa Clara intercepted and disclosed the contents of  
3 Plaintiff and Class Members' communications with Santa Clara, including the precise text of  
4 patient search queries and communications about specific doctors, communications about medical  
5 conditions and treatments, buttons clicked to Search, Find a Doctor, connect, Login, or Enroll in  
6 Santa Clara's patient portal, summaries of Santa Clara's responsive communications, the parties  
7 to the communications, appointment information, and the existence of communications at Santa  
8 Clara's websites.

9           209. For example, when a patient visits the homepage of Santa Clara's website, the  
10 source code employed by Santa Clara causes personally identifiable information to be transmitted  
11 to Facebook and Google.

12           210. Many of the tabs provided by Santa Clara on its website are specific to patients—  
13 i.e., "Find a Provider," "Patients and Visitors," "Health Care Services," "Education & Training,"  
14 and "MyHealth Online," among others (collectively, "Patient Tabs"). Clicking on any of the  
15 Patient Tabs identifies the person using the website as a patient.

16           211. For example, when a patient enters their personal information through Santa  
17 Clara's websites that incorporate Meta Pixel, such as to locate a doctor, this information, including  
18 what the patient is being treated for, is immediately and instantaneously routed to Facebook via  
19 the Meta Pixel. The acquisition and disclosure of these communications occurs  
20 contemporaneously with the transmission of these communications by patients.

21           212. This data, which can include health conditions (e.g., addiction, HIV, heart disease),  
22 diagnoses, procedures, test results, the treating physician, medications, as well as personally  
23 identifiable information (collectively, "Personal Health Information"), is obtained and used by  
24 Facebook, as well as other parties, for the purpose of targeted advertising.


25           213. In addition, through the source code deployed by Santa Clara, Santa Clara provides  
26 third parties (including Facebook and Google) with other data, such as cookies that Santa Clara  
27

1 uses to help Facebook identify patients. Those cookies include (but are not necessarily limited  
2 to) cookies named: c\_user, datr, fr, and fbp.


3 214. For example, the fbp cookie is a Facebook identifier that is set by Facebook source  
4 code and associated with Santa Clara's use of the Facebook Tracking Pixel program. The fbp  
5 cookie emanates from Santa Clara's Web Properties as a putative first-party cookie, but is  
6 transmitted to Facebook through cookie synching technology that hacks around the same-origin  
7 policy. This data was disclosed to Facebook simultaneously in real time as visitors transmitted  
8 their information, along with other data, such as patient's unique Facebook ID that is captured by  
9 the c\_user cookie, which allows Facebook to link this information to patients' unique Facebook  
10 accounts. Santa Clara also disclosed other personally identifiable information to Facebook, such  
11 as patient and user IP addresses, cookie identifiers, browser-fingerprints, and device identifiers.  
12 Santa Clara also discloses the same kind of information to Google Analytics and Google Double  
13 Click every time a patient fills out the above form.

14 215. Santa Clara causes similar data transmissions to be sent to Facebook and Google  
15 with every communication that a patient sends using the Patient Tabs.

16 216. Santa Clara discloses such personally identifiable information and sensitive  
17 medical information even when patients or users are searching for doctors to assist them with  
18 treatments such as HIV:  
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217. Likewise, if a patient wants to access their medical records, schedule appointments, email their doctor, view lab results, or refill medications, they are required to do so by navigating to Santa Clara's website patient portal—all while Santa Clara's website tracks their activity:



218. Each time a patient, including Plaintiff and Class Members, visited Santa Clara's patient portal, tracking pixels installed on the navigation button from the home page to the portal login page caused the patient's personal identifiers, including the patient's IP address, to be

1 transmitted to Google and other third parties attached to the fact that the patient has exchanged a  
2 communication with Santa Clara regarding the patient portal.

3 219. On information and belief, the Santa Clara patient portal is designed to permit the  
4 deployment of custom analytics scripts within the patient portal, including Google Analytics,  
5 which allows for the transmission of patients' Personal Health Information, including medical and  
6 health-related information, and communications to third parties.

7 220. On information and belief, Santa Clara took advantage of the patient portal's  
8 analytics compatibility by knowingly and secretly deploying Google source code inside its patient  
9 portal that caused the contemporaneous unauthorized transmission of Personal Health Information  
10 and the precise content of patient communications with Santa Clara to be sent to Google whenever  
11 a patient used the patient portal, including when Plaintiff used Santa Clara's patient portal in June  
12 2023 to communicate with her doctor and view test results.

13 221. All this information is acquired by Santa Clara and forwarded to third parties,  
14 including Google, via tracking devices that Santa Clara has installed on its Web Properties.

15 222. When a patient sends a communication searching for more information about their  
16 condition, Santa Clara causes data transmissions to be made to third parties, including Facebook  
17 and Google, which include Personal Health Information, including personally identifiable  
18 information and the content of the patient's communications.

19 223. In other words, Facebook learns not just that patients are seeking treatment, but  
20 where and typically when they are seeking treatment, along with other information that patients  
21 would reasonably assume that Santa Clara is not sharing with third party marketing companies.

22 224. Santa Clara also discloses patient information from across its website at  
23 <https://scvmc.scvh.org> including (but not limited to) communications that are captured by the  
24 website's search bar, communications that are captured when a patient searches for services  
25 offered by Santa Clara, communications made by patients making appointments, communications  
26  
27  
28

1 made when patients access Santa Clara’s patient portal, and communications made when patients  
2 are researching specific medical conditions such as COVID-19.

3 225. Despite its own legal obligations and internal policies, Santa Clara’s source code  
4 causes the interception and transmission of the following personally identifiable information  
5 (“PII”) to third parties whenever a patient uses Santa Clara’s Web Properties, including on its  
6 website and patient portal:

- 7 a. Patient IP addresses;
- 8 b. Unique, persistent patient cookie identifiers;
- 9 c. Device identifiers;
- 10 d. Account numbers;
- 11 e. URLs;
- 12 f. Other unique identifying numbers, characteristics, or codes, including patients’  
13 Facebook IDs; and
- 14 g. Browser-fingerprints.

15 226. To make the transmissions of patient information and communications to  
16 Facebook and Google, Santa Clara deployed Facebook and Google source code on its Web  
17 Properties.

18 227. The Santa Clara-deployed source code did the following things:

- 19 a. Without any action or authorization, Santa Clara deposited cookies such as  
20 the `_fbp`, `_ga`, and `_gid` cookies onto Plaintiff’s and Class Members’  
21 computing devices. These are cookies associated with the third-parties  
22 Facebook and Google but which Santa Clara deposits on Plaintiff’s and  
23 Class Members’ computing devices by disguising them as first-party  
24 cookies.
- 25 b. Without any action or authorization, Santa Clara’s source code  
26 commanded Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ computing devices to  
27

1 contemporaneously re-direct the Plaintiff's and Class Members' identifiers  
2 and the content of their communications to Facebook, Google, and others.

- 3 c. These cookies occupied storage space on Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
4 devices and used the resources of those devices without authorization,  
5 causing them to have less available storage space and work more slowly  
6 than they otherwise would have.

7  
8 228. Whenever a patient uses Santa Clara's Web Properties, Santa Clara intercepts,  
9 causes transmission of, and uses personally identifiable patient data without patient knowledge,  
10 consent, authorization, or any further action by the patient.

11 229. Santa Clara disclosed Plaintiff's and Class Members' personally identifiable  
12 patient data, including their status as patients and the contents of their communications with Santa  
13 Clara, to third parties including Facebook and Google.

14 230. Santa Clara's unauthorized disclosures to third parties include information that  
15 identifies Plaintiff and Class Members as patients of Santa Clara and aids the third parties in  
16 receiving and recording patient communications pertaining to or about specific doctors,  
17 conditions, treatments, payments, and connections to Santa Clara's patient portal.

18 231. Facebook's Meta Pixel collects and forwards this data to Facebook, including the  
19 full referral URL (including the exact subpage of the precise terms being reviewed), and Facebook  
20 then correlates the URL with the patient's Facebook user ID, time stamp, browser settings, and  
21 even the type of browser used. In short, the URLs, by virtue of including the particular document  
22 within a website that a patient views, reveal a significant amount of personal data about a patient.  
23 The captured search terms and the resulting URLs divulge a patient's medical issues, personal  
24 interests, queries, and interests on third-party websites operating outside of Facebook's platform.

25 232. The transmitted URLs contain both the "path" and the "query string" arising from  
26 patients' interactions with Santa Clara's websites. The path identifies where a file can be found  
27

1 on a website. For example, a patient reviewing information about the “Services” that Santa Clara  
2 offers patients such as information about Covid-19 will generate a URL with the path  
3 <https://scvmc.scvh.org/patients-visitors/services/covid-19-oral-antiviral>.

4 233. Likewise, a query string provides a list of parameters. An example of a URL that  
5 provides a query string is <https://scvmc.scvh.org/search?q=HIV>. The query string parameters in  
6 this search indicate that a search was done at Defendants’ website for information about  
7 chemotherapy. In other words, the Meta Pixel captures information that connects a particular user  
8 to a particular healthcare provider.

9 234. Santa Clara also provides Facebook and Google with details about online forms  
10 that patients fill out in the form of POST requests. All the information that patients provide when  
11 filling out these forms is also disclosed to Facebook and Google.

12 235. As the above demonstrates, knowing what information a patient is reviewing on  
13 Santa Clara’s website can reveal deeply personal and private information. For example, a simple  
14 search for “pregnancy” on Santa Clara’s website tells Facebook that the patient is likely pregnant.  
15 Indeed, Facebook might know that the patient is pregnant before the patient’s close family and  
16 friends. But there is nothing visible on Santa Clara’s website that would indicate to patients that,  
17 when they use Santa Clara’s search function, their personally identifiable information and the  
18 precise content of their communications with Santa Clara are being automatically captured and  
19 made available to Facebook, who can then use that information for advertising purposes even  
20 when patients search for treatment options for sensitive medical conditions such as cancer or  
21 substance abuse.

22 236. The amount of data collected is significant. Via the Meta Pixel, when patients  
23 interact with its website, Santa Clara discloses a full-string, detailed URL to Facebook, which  
24 contains the name of the website, folder and sub-folders on the webserver, and the name of the  
25 precise file requested. For example, when a patient types a search term into the search bar on  
26 Santa Clara’s website, the website returns links to information relevant to the search term. When  
27

1 patients then click these links, a communication is created that contains a GET request and a full-  
2 string detailed URL.

3 237. The contents of patients' search terms shared with Facebook plainly relate to (and  
4 disclose) the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of individual patients  
5 who interact with Santa Clara's website. Worse, no matter how sensitive the area of the Santa  
6 Clara's website that a patient reviews, the referral URL is acquired by Facebook along with other  
7 personally identifiable information.

8 238. The nature of the collected data is also important. Santa Clara's unauthorized  
9 disclosures result in Facebook obtaining a comprehensive browsing history of an individual  
10 patient, no matter how sensitive the patient's medical condition. Facebook is then able to correlate  
11 that history with the time of day and other user actions on Santa Clara's website. This process  
12 results in Facebook acquiring a vast repository of personal data about patients—all without their  
13 knowledge or consent.

14 239. Santa Clara also discloses the same kind of patient data described above to other  
15 third parties involved in internet marketing, including Google, YouTube, and New Relic, via  
16 tracking software that Santa Clara has installed on its website. As with the Facebook Meta Pixel,  
17 Santa Clara provides patients and prospective patients with no notice that Santa Clara is disclosing  
18 the contents of their communications to these third parties. Likewise, Santa Clara does not obtain  
19 consent from patients and prospective patients before forwarding their communications to these  
20 companies.

21 240. These disclosures to third parties other than Facebook are equally disturbing.  
22 Google Analytics, for example, has been described by the Wall Street Journal as "far and away  
23 the web's most dominant analytics platform," which "tracks you whether or not you are logged  
24 in."<sup>56</sup> Like Facebook, Google tracks internet users with IP addresses, cookies, geolocation, and  
25 other unique device identifiers. Santa Clara routinely discloses patients' Personal Health  
26

27 <sup>56</sup> <https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-has-more-of-your-personal-data-than-facebook-try-google-1524398401>



1 Information to such Google services as Google Analytics, Google DoubleClick, and Google  
2 AdWords.

3 241. Google cookies are personally identifiable. For example, Google cookies called  
4 ‘SID’ and ‘HSID’ contain digitally signed and encrypted records of a user’s Google account ID  
5 and most recent sign-in time.

6 242. Most people who use Google services have a preferences cookie called ‘NID’ in  
7 their browsers. When you visit a Google service, the browser sends this cookie with your request  
8 for a page. The NID cookie contains a unique ID Google uses to remember your preferences and  
9 other information.

10 243. Google uses cookies like NID and SID to help customize ads on Google properties,  
11 like Google Search. For example, Google uses such cookies to remember users’ most recent  
12 searches, previous interactions with an advertiser’s ads or search results, and visits to an  
13 advertiser’s website. This helps Google show customized ads to users on Google.

14 244. Google also uses one or more cookies for advertising it serves across the web. One  
15 of the main advertising cookies on non-Google sites is named ‘IDE’ and is stored in browsers  
16 under the domain doubleclick.net. Another is stored in google.com and is called ANID. Google  
17 also uses other cookies with names such as DSID, FLC, AID, TAID, and exchange\_uid. Other  
18 Google properties, like YouTube, may also use these cookies to show users ads.

19 245. Google cookies provide personally identifiable data about patients who visit Santa  
20 Clara’s website to Google. Santa Clara transmits personally identifiable Google cookie data to  
21 Google.

22 246. Google warns web-developers that Google marketing tools are not appropriate for  
23 health-related webpages and websites. Indeed, Google warns web developers that “Health” is a  
24 prohibited category that should not be used by advertisers to target ads to users or promote  
25 advertisers’ products or services.

1           247. Santa Clara deploys Google tracking tools on essentially every page of its  
2 websites, resulting in the disclosure of communications exchanged with patients to be transmitted  
3 to Google. These transmissions occur simultaneously with patients' communications with Santa  
4 Clara and include communications that Plaintiff and Class Members made about specific medical  
5 providers, treatments, conditions, appointments, payments, and registrations and logins to Santa  
6 Clara's patient portal.

7           248. By compelling visitors to its websites to disclose personally identifiable data and  
8 sensitive medical information to Facebook, Santa Clara knowingly discloses information that  
9 allows Facebook and other advertisers to link patients' and visitors' Personal Health Information  
10 to their private identities and target them with advertising (or do whatever else Facebook may  
11 choose to do with this data, including running "experiments" on its customers by manipulating  
12 the information they are shown on their Facebook pages).<sup>57</sup> Santa Clara intentionally shared the  
13 Personal Health Information of its patients with Facebook in order to gain access to the benefits  
14 of the Meta Pixel tool.

15           249. Santa Clara facilitated the disclosure of Plaintiff's Personal Health Information,  
16 including sensitive medical information, to Facebook without her consent or authorization when  
17 he entered information on the website that Santa Clara maintains at <https://scvmc.scvh.org/home>.

18           250. For example, Plaintiff Jane Doe is an individual with a Facebook account who is  
19 also a patient of Santa Clara and who has received treatment by Santa Clara's doctors at Santa  
20 Clara's medical facilities. Plaintiff has been a Santa Clara Valley Medical Center patient since  
21 2017. Plaintiff has visited Santa Clara's website since 2018, including in June 2023, and entered  
22 data, including sensitive medical information, such as details about her medical condition.  
23 Plaintiff has regularly used Santa Clara's patient portal since 2017. The information that Plaintiff  
24 transmitted included queries about treatment for cirrhosis of liver and ascites, generalized anxiety  
25

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26 <sup>57</sup> [https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/06/everything-we-know-about-facebooks-secret-mood-](https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/06/everything-we-know-about-facebooks-secret-mood-manipulation-experiment/373648/)  
27 [manipulation-experiment/373648/](https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/06/everything-we-know-about-facebooks-secret-mood-manipulation-experiment/373648/)

1 disorder, migraines, and carpal tunnel syndrome. The treatments that Plaintiff explored on Santa  
2 Clara's website included psychiatric treatment, physical therapy, and pain management. She also  
3 used Santa Clara's website to search for a neurologist.

4 251. Throughout, Plaintiff has also used Santa Clara's patient portal to schedule  
5 appointments, order medications, view test results, and message her doctor.

6 252. In addition to using Santa Clara's patient portal (for which the navigation button  
7 to the login page was embedded with a tracking pixel), when interacting with the Santa Clara's  
8 website and patient portal, Plaintiff also communicated such specific details as her name, her  
9 patient status, the name of her specific treating physician, her browsing history, and the name of  
10 the specific medical conditions that she was seeking treatment for.

11 253. This information could then be combined with other information in Facebook's  
12 possession, like her name, date of birth, and phone number, to more effectively target Plaintiff  
13 with advertisements or sell Plaintiff's data to third parties.

14 254. Because Santa Clara embedded the Meta Pixel on its website, Santa Clara  
15 disclosed intimate details about Plaintiff's interactions with its website, including Plaintiff's  
16 scrolling, typing, and selecting options from drop down menus. Each time the Meta Pixel was  
17 triggered, it caused Plaintiff's information to be secretly transmitted to Facebook's servers, as  
18 well as additional information that captures and discloses the communications' content and  
19 Plaintiff's identity. For example, when Plaintiff and Class Members visited Santa Clara's website,  
20 their Personal Health Information was transmitted to Facebook, including such engagement as  
21 using the website's search bar, using the website's Find a Doctor function, and typing content into  
22 online forms. During these same transmissions, Santa Clara's website would also provide  
23 Facebook with Plaintiff's and Class Members' Facebook ID, IP addresses, device IDs, and other  
24 information that Plaintiff and Class Members provided. This is precisely the type of information  
25 that state and federal law require healthcare providers to de-identify to protect the privacy of  
26 patients.

1           255. Facebook and Google used the data provided by Santa Clara to send Plaintiff  
2 targeted advertising related to her medical conditions. Indeed, after visiting Santa Clara’s website,  
3 Plaintiff began receiving targeted advertising on her Facebook page related to her medical  
4 conditions, including advertisements for pain management, other advertisements for medications  
5 for her various conditions, and solicitations to participate in research questionnaires, research  
6 studies, and clinical trials.

7           256. Because Santa Clara embedded the Meta Pixel on its websites, Santa Clara  
8 disclosed intimate details about Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ interactions with its websites,  
9 including when Plaintiff and Class Members selected options from drop down menus.

10           257. One or more persons at Facebook and Google viewed Plaintiff’s and Class  
11 Members’ Personal Health Information as a consequence of Santa Clara’s installation of the Meta  
12 Pixel on its Web Properties. After Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Personal Health Information  
13 had been intercepted and collected, individuals at Facebook processed, analyzed, and assimilated  
14 Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Personal Health Information into data sets like “Core Audiences”  
15 and “Custom Audiences” for the purpose of targeting Plaintiff and Class Members with  
16 advertising.

17           258. Santa Clara knew that by embedding Meta Pixel—a Facebook advertising tool—  
18 it was permitting Facebook to collect, use, and share Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ Personal  
19 Health Information, including sensitive medical information and personally identifying data.  
20 Santa Clara was also aware that such information would be shared with Facebook simultaneously  
21 with patients’ interactions with its websites. Santa Clara was also aware that installing the Meta  
22 Pixel tool would result in one or more unauthorized persons at Facebook and Google viewing the  
23 Personal Health Information of Santa Clara’s patients, including the Personal Health Information  
24 of Plaintiff and Class Members. Santa Clara’s decision to affirmatively communicate and share  
25 its patients’ Personal Health Information with Facebook, Google, and those companies’  
26 employees violates the numerous protections afforded by California law.

1           259. Santa Clara also knew that installing the Meta Pixel on its website would result in  
2 its patients' Personal Health Information being improperly accessed by Facebook and its  
3 employees so that Facebook could sell advertising. Santa Clara made the decision to barter its  
4 patients' Personal Health Information to Facebook because it wanted access to the Meta Pixel  
5 tool. While that bargain may have benefited Santa Clara and Facebook, it also violated the privacy  
6 rights of Plaintiff and Class Members.

7 **G. Santa Clara's interception and disclosure of patient communications permits Facebook,**  
8 **Google, and other third-party advertising companies to engage in cross-device targeting**  
**across multiple devices.**

9           260. In addition to enabling Santa Clara to advertise to patients and potential patients  
10 on other websites, Santa Clara's misuse and exploitation of patient data and communications also  
11 facilitates third parties' ability to target advertisements on other computing devices that a patient  
12 uses. This is called cross-device targeting.

13           261. Third parties including Facebook and Google have established a unique ID for  
14 individuals that tie together their desktop, laptop, and smartphone computing devices. For  
15 example, even if a patient has never visited Santa Clara's website on their smartphone, cross-  
16 device tracking and marketing allows Santa Clara and other third parties to target patients on that  
17 device. In other words, a patient or potential patient who visited Santa Clara's website on his  
18 desktop, but never on his smartphone, can nevertheless be targeted with advertisements by both  
19 Santa Clara and other third parties on his smartphone.

20           262. Santa Clara's and other third parties' use of cross-device targeting demonstrates  
21 that the data Santa Clara discloses to third parties is personally identifiable because it enables  
22 patients to be tracked across multiple devices that patients own—even if a patient has never  
23 communicated with Santa Clara on one or more of their devices.

24           263. Santa Clara has made the decision that access to the targeted advertising (including  
25 retargeting and cross-device tracking) that is enabled by its disclosure of patient data and  
26 communications is of commercial benefit to Santa Clara.

1           264. Santa Clara obtains additional revenue from its deployment of third-party tracking  
2 tools through which it discloses personally identifying patient data and communications to third  
3 parties, including Google and Facebook.

4           265. Any additional revenue that that Santa Clara obtained from its unauthorized misuse  
5 of its own patients' Personal Health Information is unearned and is the rightful property of the  
6 patients (including Plaintiff and Class Members) from whom it was obtained.

7           266. Santa Clara's unauthorized disclosure and misuse of Plaintiff's and Class  
8 Members' Personal Health Information is a form of theft, for which the victims are entitled to  
9 recover anything acquired with the stolen assets, even if the items acquired have a value that  
10 exceeds the value of that which was stolen.

11 **H. Plaintiff and the Class Members did not consent to the interception and disclosure of**  
12 **their Protected Health Information.**

13           267. Plaintiff and Class Members had no idea when they interacted with Santa Clara's  
14 websites that their personal data, including sensitive medical data, was being collected and  
15 simultaneously transmitted to Facebook. That is because, among other things, the Meta Pixel tool  
16 is seamlessly and secretly integrated into Santa Clara's websites and is invisible to patients visiting  
17 those websites.

18           268. For example, when Plaintiff visited Santa Clara's website in 2023, there was no  
19 indication her Personal Health Information was being collected, transmitted, and monitored by  
20 Facebook for advertising purposes.

21           269. Plaintiff and her fellow Class Members could not consent to Santa Clara's conduct  
22 when there was no indication that their sensitive medical information would be collected and  
23 transmitted to Facebook, Google, and other third parties for the purpose of targeting them with  
24 advertising.

25           270. Moreover, it is against the law for Santa Clara to disclose individually identifying  
26 health information without giving appropriate notice to the patient and obtaining written consent.  
27

271. Santa Clara does not have a legal right to share Plaintiff's and Class Members' Protected Health Information ("PHI") with Facebook, because this information is protected from such disclosure by law. *See, e.g.,* CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56 *et seq.*; 45 C.F.R. § 164.508. Nor is Santa Clara permitted to disclose patients' Protected Health Information to an advertising and marketing company like Facebook without express written authorization from patients.

272. Indeed, the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") recently confirmed that hospitals are prohibited from transmitting individually identifiable health information via tracking technology like the Meta Pixel without a patient's authorization and other protections like a business associate agreement with the recipient of the patient data:

Regulated entities [those to which HIPAA applies] are not permitted to use tracking technologies in a manner that would result in impermissible disclosures of PHI to tracking technology vendors or any other violations of the HIPAA Rules. *For example, disclosures of PHI to tracking technology vendors for marketing purposes, without individuals' HIPAA-compliant authorizations, would constitute impermissible disclosures.*<sup>58</sup>

273. The disclosure of Plaintiff's and class members' Personal Health Information via the tracking pixels contravenes both the letter and spirit of HIPAA's "Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information" (also known as the "Privacy Rule") which governs how health care providers must safeguard and protect Personal Health Information.

274. The bulletin discusses the types of harm that disclosure may cause to the patient:

An impermissible disclosure of an individual's PHI not only violates the Privacy Rule but also may result in a wide range of additional harms to the individual or others. For example, an impermissible disclosure of PHI may result in identity theft, financial loss, **discrimination, stigma, mental anguish, or other serious negative consequences to the reputation, health, or physical safety of the individual or to others identified in the individual's PHI.** Such disclosures can reveal incredibly sensitive information about an individual, **including diagnoses, frequency of visits to a therapist or other health care professionals, and where an individual seeks medical treatment.** While

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<sup>58</sup> *Use of Online Tracking Technologies by HIPAA Covered Entities and Business Associates*, available at <https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/hipaa-online-tracking/index.html>, HHS.GOV (emphasis added) (last visited June 12, 2023).

1 it has always been true that regulated entities may not impermissibly disclose PHI to  
 2 tracking technology vendors, **because of the proliferation of tracking technologies**  
 3 **collecting sensitive information, now more than ever, it is critical for regulated**  
 4 **entities to ensure that they disclose PHI only as expressly permitted or required**  
 5 **by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.**<sup>59</sup>

6 275. Plaintiff and Class Members face the same risks the government is warning about.  
 7 Santa Clara has shared Plaintiff's and Class Members' search terms about health conditions for  
 8 which they seek doctors; their contacts with doctors to make appointments; the names of their  
 9 doctors; the frequency with which they take steps to obtain healthcare for certain conditions; and  
 10 where they seek medical treatment. This information is, as described by the OCR bulletin, "highly  
 11 sensitive." The Bulletin goes on to make clear how broad the government's view of protected  
 12 information is.

13 276. This information might include an individual's medical record number, home or  
 14 email address, or dates of appointments, as well as an individual's IP address or geographic  
 15 location, medical device IDs, *or any unique identifying code.*<sup>60</sup>

16 277. Crucially, that paragraph in the government's Bulletin continues:

17 All such [individually identifiable health information ("IIHI")]  
 18 collected on a regulated entity's website or mobile app generally is  
 19 PHI, even if the individual does not have an existing relationship  
 20 with the regulated entity and even if the IIHI, such as IP address or  
 21 geographic location, does not include specific treatment or billing  
 22 information like dates and types of health care services. This is  
 23 because, when a regulated entity collects the individual's IIHI  
 24 through its website or mobile app, the information connects the  
 25 individual to the regulated entity (i.e., it is indicative that the  
 26 individual has received or will receive health care services or  
 27 benefits from the covered entity), and thus relates to the individual's  
 28 past, present, or future health or health care or payment for care.<sup>61</sup>

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25 <sup>59</sup> *Id.* (emphasis added).

26 <sup>60</sup> *Id.* (emphasis added).

27 <sup>61</sup> *Id.*



278. Likewise, after it became public knowledge that healthcare companies had been sharing their customers' medical information with Facebook and Google via tracking technologies embedded in their websites and apps, the FTC instituted a series of enforcement actions, including lawsuits against BetterHelp, GoodRx, Premom, and Vitagene. These lawsuits, which resulted in healthcare companies paying millions of dollars in fines, underscore that healthcare companies violate both their privacy promises and federal law by failing to get consumers' affirmative express consent for the disclosure of sensitive health information.

279. On July 20, 2023, the Federal Trade Commission, acting in concert with the United States Department of Health and Human Services' Office for Civil Rights, sent letters to approximately 130 hospital systems and telehealth providers to alert them "to the serious privacy and security risks related to the use of online tracking technologies" on hospital websites which have been "impermissibly disclosing consumers' sensitive health information to third parties."<sup>62</sup>

280. The FTC's letter specifically warned hospitals that "use of technologies, such as the Meta/Facebook pixel and Google Analytics, that can track a user's online activities" can result in "a wide range of harms to an individual or others", including the disclosure of "health conditions, diagnoses, medications, medical treatments, frequency of visits to health care professionals, where an individual seeks medical treatment, and more."<sup>63</sup> The FTC's letter further warned hospitals that "HIPAA rules apply when the information that a regulated entity collects through tracking technologies or discloses to third parties (*e.g.* tracking technology vendors) includes PHI. HIPAA regulated entities are not permitted to use tracking technologies in a manner that would result in impermissible disclosures of PHI to third parties or any other violations of the HIPAA rules."<sup>64</sup>

281. That same day the FTC issued a bulletin warning that even companies not covered by HIPAA have a responsibility to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of Personal Health Information and cautioning that the "unauthorized disclosure of such information may violate the

<sup>62</sup> [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc\\_gov/pdf/FTC-OCR-Letter-Third-Party-Trackers-07-20-2023.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/FTC-OCR-Letter-Third-Party-Trackers-07-20-2023.pdf)

<sup>63</sup> [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc\\_gov/pdf/FTC-OCR-Letter-Third-Party-Trackers-07-20-2023.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/FTC-OCR-Letter-Third-Party-Trackers-07-20-2023.pdf)

<sup>64</sup> [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc\\_gov/pdf/FTC-OCR-Letter-Third-Party-Trackers-07-20-2023.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/FTC-OCR-Letter-Third-Party-Trackers-07-20-2023.pdf)

1 FTC Act and could constitute a breach of security under the FTC’s Health Breach Notification  
2 Rule.”<sup>65</sup>

3 282. Santa Clara failed to obtain a valid written authorization from Plaintiff or any of  
4 the Class Members to allow the capture and exploitation of their personally identifiable  
5 information and the contents of their communications by third parties for their own direct  
6 marketing uses. Moreover, no *additional* privacy breach by Facebook is necessary for harm to have  
7 accrued to Plaintiff and Class Members; the secret disclosure by Santa Clara of its patients’  
8 Personal Health Information to Facebook means that a significant privacy injury has *already*  
9 *occurred*.

10 283. Likewise, a prospective or current patient’s reasonable expectation that their health  
11 care provider will not share their information with third parties for marketing purposes is not  
12 subject to waiver via an inconspicuous privacy policy hidden away on a company’s website. Such  
13 “Browser-Wrap” statements do not create an enforceable contract against consumers.

14 284. Neither Plaintiff nor Class Members knowingly consented to Santa Clara’s  
15 disclosure of their Personal Health Information to Facebook. Nowhere in Santa Clara’s privacy  
16 policy is it disclosed that Santa Clara routinely transmits patients’ Personal Health Information to  
17 third party advertising companies like Facebook so that those companies can monetize and exploit  
18 patients’ health data for advertising purposes. Without disclosing such practices, Santa Clara  
19 cannot have secured consent from Plaintiff and Class Members for the disclosure of their Personal  
20 Health Information to Facebook and other third-party advertising companies.

21 285. Accordingly, Santa Clara lacked authorization to intercept, collect, and disclose  
22 Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Personal Health Information to Facebook or aid in the same.

23 **I. The disclosure of personal patient data to Facebook is unnecessary.**

24 286. There is no information anywhere on the websites operated by Santa Clara that  
25 would alert patients that their most private information (such as their identifiers, their medical  
26

27 <sup>65</sup> <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/07/ftc-hhs-warn-hospital-systems-telehealth-providers-about-privacy-security-risks-online-tracking>

1 conditions, and their medical providers) is being automatically transmitted to Facebook. Nor are  
2 the disclosures of patient Personal Health Information to Facebook necessary for Santa Clara to  
3 maintain their healthcare website or provide medical services to patients.

4 287. For example, it is possible for a healthcare website to provide a doctor search  
5 function without allowing disclosures to third-party advertising companies about patient sign ups  
6 or appointments. It is also possible for a website developer to utilize tracking tools without  
7 allowing disclosure of patients' Personal Health Information to companies like Facebook.  
8 Likewise, it is possible for Santa Clara to provide medical services to patients without sharing  
9 their Personal Health Information with Facebook so that this information can be exploited for  
10 advertising purposes.

11 288. Despite these possibilities, Santa Clara willfully chose to implement Meta Pixel  
12 on its websites and aid in the disclosure of personally identifiable information and sensitive  
13 medical information about its patients, as well as the contents of their communications with Santa  
14 Clara, to third parties, including Facebook and Google.

15 **J. Plaintiff and Class Members have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their Personal**  
16 **Health Information, especially with respect to sensitive medical information.**

17 289. Plaintiff and Class Members have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their  
18 Personal Health Information, including personally identifiable data and sensitive medical  
19 information. Santa Clara's surreptitious interception, collection, and disclosure of Personal Health  
20 Information to Facebook violated Plaintiff and Class Members' privacy interests.

21 290. As a patient, Plaintiff and Class Members had a reasonable expectation of privacy  
22 that her health care provider and its associates would not disclose their Personal Health  
23 Information to third parties without their express authorization. Those expectations are derived  
24 from multiple sources, including (a) Santa Clara's status as Plaintiff's and Class Members' health  
25 care provider, (b) Santa Clara's common-law obligations to maintain the confidentiality of patient  
26 data and communications, (c) state and federal laws and regulations protecting the confidentiality  
27 of medical information, (d) state and federal laws protecting the confidentiality of electronic

1 communications and computer data, and (e) state laws protecting unauthorized use of personal  
2 means of identification.

3 291. The original Hippocratic Oath, circa 400 B.C., provided that physicians must  
4 pledge, “What I may see or hear in the course of treatment or even outside of the treatment in  
5 regard to the life of man, which on no account must be spread abroad, I will keep to myself holding  
6 such things shameful to be spoken about.”<sup>66</sup>

7 292. The modern Hippocratic Oath provides, “I will respect the privacy of my patients,  
8 for their problems are not disclosed to me that the world may know.”<sup>67</sup> Likewise, the American  
9 Medical Association’s (“AMA”) Code of Medical Ethics contains numerous rules protecting the  
10 privacy of patient data and communications. For example, the AMA has issued medical ethics  
11 opinions providing that

12 Protecting information gathered in association with the care of a patient  
13 is a core value in health care. However, respecting patient privacy in  
14 other forms is also fundamental, as an expression of respect for patient  
15 autonomy and a prerequisite for trust....Physicians must seek to protect  
16 patient privacy in all settings to the greatest extent possible and should  
17 ... [m]inimize intrusion on privacy when the patient’s privacy must be  
balanced against other factors [and inform] the patient when there has  
been a significant infringement on privacy of which the patient would  
otherwise not be aware.”<sup>68</sup>

18 293. The AMA’s ethics opinions have further cautioned physicians and hospitals that  
19 “[d]isclosing information to third parties for commercial purposes without consent undermines  
20 trust, violates principles of informed consent and confidentiality, and may harm the integrity of  
21 the patient-physician relationship.”<sup>69</sup>

22  
23  
24 <sup>66</sup> *Brandt v. Medical Defense Associates*, 856 S.W.2d 667, 671 n.1 (Mo. 1993).

25 <sup>67</sup> [https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath\\_modern.html](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath_modern.html)

26 <sup>68</sup> <https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-3.pdf>  
(opinion 3.1.1).

27 <sup>69</sup> <https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-3.pdf>  
(opinion 3.2.4).

1           294. Patient health information is specifically protected by law. The prohibitions  
2 against disclosing patient Personal Health Information include prohibitions against disclosing  
3 personally identifiable data such as patient names, IP addresses, and other unique characteristics  
4 or codes. *See, e.g.*, CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.05 (“medical information”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.514.

5           295. Plaintiff and Class Members’ reasonable expectations of privacy in their Personal  
6 Health Information are grounded in, among other things, Defendants’ status as a health care  
7 provider, Defendants’ common-law obligation to maintain the confidentiality of patients’  
8 Personal Health Information, state and federal laws protecting the confidentiality of medical  
9 information, state and federal laws protecting the confidentiality of communications and computer  
10 data, and state laws prohibiting the unauthorized use and disclosure of personal means of  
11 identification.

12           296. Given the application of these laws to Santa Clara, Plaintiff and the Members of  
13 the Class had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their Protected Health Information.

14           297. Indeed, several studies examining the collection and disclosure of consumers’  
15 sensitive medical information confirm that the disclosure of sensitive medical information  
16 violates expectations of privacy that have been established as general social norms.

17           298. Polls and studies also uniformly show that the overwhelming majority of  
18 Americans consider one of the most important privacy rights to be the need for an individual’s  
19 affirmative consent before a company collects and shares its customers’ data.

20           299. For example, a recent study by *Consumer Reports* showed that 92% of Americans  
21 believe that internet companies and websites should be required to obtain consent before selling  
22 or sharing consumers’ data, and the same percentage believed that internet companies and  
23 websites should be required to provide consumers with a complete list of the data that has been  
24 collected about them.<sup>70</sup>

25  
26  
27 <sup>70</sup> <https://www.consumerreports.org/consumer-reports/consumers-less-confident-about-healthcare-data-privacy-and-car-safety-a3980496907/>

1           300. Users act consistently with these preferences. For example, following a new rollout  
 2 of the iPhone operating software—which asks users for clear, affirmative consent before allowing  
 3 companies to track users—85 percent of worldwide users and 94 percent of U.S. users chose not  
 4 to share data when prompted.<sup>71</sup>

5           301. “Patients are highly sensitive to disclosure of their health information,”  
 6 particularly because it “often involves intimate and personal facts, with a heavy emotional  
 7 overlay.”<sup>72</sup> Unsurprisingly, empirical evidence demonstrates that “[w]hen asked, the  
 8 overwhelming majority of Americans express concern about the privacy of their medical  
 9 records.”<sup>73</sup>

10           302. The concern about sharing personal medical information is compounded by the  
 11 reality that advertisers view this type of information as particularly valuable. Indeed, having  
 12 access to the data women share with their healthcare providers allows advertisers to obtain data  
 13 on children before they are even born. As one recent article noted, “What is particularly worrying  
 14 about this process of datafication of children is that companies like [Facebook] are harnessing and  
 15 collecting multiple typologies of children’s data and have the potential to store a plurality of data  
 16 traces under unique ID profiles.”<sup>74</sup>

17           303. Many privacy law experts have expressed serious concerns about patients’  
 18 sensitive medical information being disclosed to third-party companies like Facebook. As those  
 19 critics have pointed out, having a patient’s Personal Health Information disseminated in ways the  
 20 patient is unaware of could have serious repercussions, including affecting their ability to obtain  
 21 life insurance, how much they might pay for such coverage, the rates they might be charged on  
 22 loans, and the likelihood of their being discriminated against.

23  
 24 <sup>71</sup> <https://www.wired.co.uk/article/apple-ios14-facebook>

25 <sup>72</sup> Peter A. Winn, *Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Common Law*, 33 RUTGERS L.J.  
 617, 621 (2002).

26 <sup>73</sup> Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, *E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability and Electronic Health Record*  
*Systems*, 24 BERKLEY TECH L.J. 1523, 1557 (2009).

27 <sup>74</sup> <https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/tech-companies-are-profiling-us-from-before-birth/>

**K. Plaintiff's and Class Members' Personal Health Information that Santa Clara collected, disclosed, and used has economic value, and its disclosure has caused Plaintiff and Class Members harm.**

304. Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy, or dispose of a thing, including intangible things like data and communications. Plaintiff and Class Members have a vested property right in their Personal Health Information.

305. The United States Supreme Court has explained that, "Confidential business information has long been recognized as property." *Carpenter v. United States*, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987). "Depriv[ation] of [the] right to exclusive use of ... information" causes a loss of property "for exclusivity is an important aspect of confidential business information and most private property for that matter." *Id.* at 27. There is no doubt that Santa Clara has a "property right" in patient data such that, if Facebook or Google took such information from Santa Clara without authorization, Santa Clara would have a claim for Facebook and Google's taking of their property. Patients also have a property right in their own health information that may not be taken or used by Santa Clara without their authorization for non-health care related reasons.

306. Federal and state law grant patients the right to protect the confidentiality of data that identifies them as patients of a particular health care provider and restrict the use of their health data, including their status as a patient, to only uses related to their care or otherwise authorized by federal or state law in the absence of patient authorization.

307. A patient's right to protect the confidentiality of their health data and restrict access to it is a valuable right.

308. In addition to property rights in their health data, patients enjoy property rights in the privacy of their health communications.

309. Patient property rights in their health data and communications are established by HIPAA and state health privacy laws that are equally or more stringent than HIPAA, including CIMA.

1           310. Santa Clara’s unauthorized acquisition, use, and disclosure of Plaintiff’s and Class  
2 Members’ individual Personal Health Information for marketing purposes violated their property  
3 rights to control how their health data and communications are used and who may be the  
4 beneficiaries of their data and communications.

5           311. It is common knowledge that there is an economic market for consumers’ personal  
6 data—including the kind of data that Santa Clara has collected and disclosed from Plaintiff and  
7 Class Members. Indeed, the value of data that companies like Facebook and Google extract from  
8 people who use the Internet is well understood and generally accepted in the e-commerce industry.

9           312. Personal information is now viewed as a form of currency. Professor Paul M.  
10 Schwartz noted in the Harvard Law Review:

11           Personal information is an important currency in the new millennium. The monetary value  
12 of personal data is large and still growing, and corporate America is moving quickly to profit from  
13 the trend. Companies view this information as a corporate asset and have invested heavily in  
14 software that facilitates the collection of consumer information. Paul M. Schwartz, Property,  
15 Privacy and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2056-57 (2004).

16           313. For example, in 2013, the *Financial Times* reported that the data-broker industry  
17 profits from the trade of thousands of details about individuals, and that within that context, “age,  
18 gender and location information” were being sold for approximately “\$0.50 per 1,000 people.”

19           314. In a 2021 Washington Post article, the legal scholar Dina Srinivasan said that  
20 consumers “should think of Facebook’s cost as [their] data and scrutinize the power it has to set  
21 its own price.” This price is only increasing. According to Facebook’s own financial statements,  
22 the value of the average American’s data in advertising sales rose from \$19 to \$164 per year  
23 between 2013 and 2020.

24           315. Medical information derived from medical providers garners even more value  
25 from the fact that it is not available to third party data marketing companies because of strict  
26  
27



1 restrictions on provider disclosures under HIPAA, state laws, and provider standards, including  
2 the Hippocratic oath.

3 316. The cash value of Internet users' Personal Health Information can be quantified.  
4 In a 2015 study by the Ponemon Institute, researchers determined the value that American Internet  
5 users place on their "health condition" as more valuable than any other piece of data about them,  
6 with a minimum value of \$82.90.<sup>75</sup>

7 317. In 2015, *TechCrunch* reported that "to obtain a list containing the names of  
8 individuals suffering from a particular disease," a market participant would have to spend about  
9 "\$0.30" per name. That same article noted that "Data has become a strategic asset that allows  
10 companies to acquire or maintain a competitive edge" and that the value of a single user's data  
11 can vary from \$15 to more than \$40 per user.

12 318. Despite the protections afforded by law, there is an active market for health  
13 information. Medical information obtained from health care providers garners substantial value  
14 because of the fact that it is not generally available to third party data marketing companies  
15 because of the strict restrictions on disclosure of such information by state laws and provider  
16 standards, including the Hippocratic oath. Even with these restrictions, however, a multi-billion-  
17 dollar market exists for the sale and purchase of such private medical information.

18 319. Further, individuals can sell or monetize their own data if they so choose. For  
19 example, Facebook has offered to pay individuals for their voice recordings and has paid teenagers  
20 and adults up to \$20 a month plus referral fees to install an app that allows Facebook to collect  
21 data on how individuals use their smart phones.

22 320. A myriad of other companies and apps such as DataCoup, Nielsen Computer, Killi,  
23 and UpVoice also offer consumers money in exchange for access to their personal data.

24  
25  
26 <sup>75</sup> Ponemon Institute, Privacy and Security in a Connected Life: A Study of US Consumers, March 2015,  
27 available at <https://vdocuments.site/privacy-and-security-in-a-connected-life-protect-personal-information-from-being.html?page=1>.

1           321. Santa Clara was compensated for its disclosures of Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
2 personally identifiable patient data and communications by the third-party recipients in the form  
3 of enhanced marketing services or other compensation.

4           322. Santa Clara did not pay or offer to pay Plaintiff or Class Members for their  
5 communications or personally identifiable patient data associated with these disclosures before or  
6 after the disclosures were made.

7           323. Santa Clara profited from Plaintiff's and Class Members' information without ever  
8 intending to compensate Plaintiff and Class Members or inform them that the disclosures had  
9 been made.

10          324. Santa Clara was unjustly enriched by its conduct.

11          325. Given the monetary value that data companies like Facebook have already paid for  
12 personal information in the past, Santa Clara has deprived Plaintiff and the Class Members of the  
13 economic value of their sensitive medical information by collecting, using, and disclosing that  
14 information to Facebook and other third parties without consideration for Plaintiff's and the Class  
15 Members' property.

16 **L. Santa Clara's failure to inform its patients and prospective patients that their Personal**  
17 **Health Information has been disclosed to Facebook or to take any steps to halt the**  
18 **continued disclosure of patients' Personal Health Information is malicious, oppressive,**  
**and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff and Class Members' rights.**

19          326. Hospital systems, like other businesses, have a legal obligation to disclose data  
20 breaches to their customers. *E.g.* CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82.

21          327. Santa Clara's decision to hide its use of the Meta Pixel tool from its own patients  
22 and its refusal to remove all such technologies from its websites even after learning that its  
23 patients' Personal Health Information was being routinely collected, transmitted, and exploited  
24 by Facebook, Google, and other third parties is malicious, oppressive, and in reckless disregard  
25 of Plaintiff's and Class Members' rights.

26 **M. Tolling, Concealment, and Estoppel**

27          328. The applicable statutes of limitation have been tolled as a result of Defendants'

1 knowing and active concealment and denial of the facts alleged herein.

2 329. Santa Clara seamlessly and secretively incorporated Meta Pixel and other trackers  
3 into its websites, providing no indication to users that they were interacting with a website enabled  
4 by Meta Pixel. Santa Clara had knowledge that its websites incorporated Meta Pixel and other  
5 trackers yet failed to disclose that by interacting with Meta-Pixel enabled websites that Plaintiff  
6 and Class Members' sensitive medical information would be intercepted, collected, used by, and  
7 disclosed to Facebook.

8 330. Plaintiff and Class Members could not with due diligence have discovered the full  
9 scope of Defendants' conduct, because there were no disclosures or other indication that Santa  
10 Clara was sharing their Personal Health Information with companies like Facebook, so that  
11 Facebook could exploit their Personal Health Information via targeted advertising campaigns.

12 331. All applicable statutes of limitation have also been tolled by operation of the  
13 discovery rule and the doctrine of continuing tort. Defendants' illegal interception and disclosure  
14 of patients' and users' Personal Health Information has continued unabated through the date of  
15 the filing of this complaint. What's more, Santa Clara was under a duty to disclose the nature and  
16 significance of its data collection practices but did not do so. Defendants are therefore estopped  
17 from relying on any statute of limitations defenses.

## 18 VII. CLASS DEFINIITION

19 332. Defendants' conduct violates the law.

20 333. Defendants' unlawful conduct has injured Plaintiff and Class Members.

21 334. Defendants' conduct is ongoing.

22 335. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action against Defendants.

23 336. Plaintiff brings this action in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23  
24 individually and on behalf of the following proposed Class and Subclass:

25 **Santa Clara Valley Medical Center Class:** For the period  
26 August 25, 2018, to the present, all patients or prospective patients  
27 of Santa Clara Valley Medical Center or any of its affiliates who  
exchanged communications at Santa Clara Valley Medical  
Center's websites, including <https://scvmc.scvh.org> and any other

Santa Clara Valley Medical Center-affiliated website, including Santa Clara Valley Medical Center's patient portals.

**The Patient Subclass:** For the period August 25, 2018, to the present all patients of Santa Clara Valley Medical Center or any of its affiliates and who exchanged communications at Santa Clara Valley Medical Center's websites, including <https://scvmc.scvh.org> and any other Santa Clara Valley Medical Center-affiliated website, including Santa Clara Valley Medical Center's patient portals.

337. Excluded from the Class and Subclass are: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action or appellate judge assigned to this case and any members of their staff and immediate families; (2) any jurors assigned to hear this case as well as their immediate families; (3) the Defendants, Defendants' subsidiaries, affiliates, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers, and directors; and (4) Plaintiff's counsel and Defendants' counsel.

338. Plaintiff and Class Members satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and predominance requirements for suing as representative parties.

339. **Numerosity:** The exact number of members of the Class is unknown and unavailable to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class likely consists of thousands of individuals. The exact number of Class Members can be determined by review of information maintained by Defendants. The proposed class is defined objectively in terms of ascertainable criteria.

340. **Predominant Common Questions:** The Class's claims present common questions of law and fact, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual Class Members. Common questions for the Class include, but are not limited to, the following:

- (a) Whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's and Class Members' privacy rights;
- (b) Whether Defendants' acts and practices violated California's Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, CIVIL CODE §§ 56, *et seq.*;

- 1 (c) Whether Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to equitable relief,  
2 including but not limited to, injunctive relief, restitution, and  
3 disgorgement; and,  
4 (d) Whether Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to actual,  
5 statutory, punitive or other forms of damages, and other monetary relief.

6 341. **Typicality:** Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the  
7 Class. The claims of Plaintiff and the members of the Class arise from the same conduct by  
8 Defendants and are based on the same legal theories.

9 342. **Adequate Representation:** Plaintiff has and will continue to fairly and adequately  
10 represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and  
11 experienced in complex litigation and class actions, including litigations to remedy privacy  
12 violations. Plaintiff has no interest that is in conflict with the interests of the Class, and Defendants  
13 have no defenses unique to any Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously  
14 prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and she has the resources to do so.  
15 Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to the interests of the other members of  
16 the Class.

17 343. **Superiority:** This class action is appropriate for certification because class  
18 proceedings are superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  
19 controversy and joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. This proposed class action  
20 presents fewer management difficulties than individual litigation, and provides the benefits of  
21 single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Class  
22 treatment will create economies of time, effort, and expense and promote uniform decision-  
23 making.

24 344. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the foregoing class allegations and definitions  
25 based on facts learned and legal developments following additional investigation, discovery, or  
26 otherwise.  
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## VIII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

### COUNT I—VIOLATIONS OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT (“ECPA”) 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) *ET SEQ.* UNAUTHORIZED INTERCEPTION, USE, AND DISCLOSURE

345. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs.

346. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and all members of the Santa Clara Valley Medical Center Class against Defendants.

347. The ECPA protects both sending and receipt of communications.

348. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) provides a private right of action to any person whose wire or electronic communications are intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of Chapter 119.

349. The transmissions of Plaintiff’s Personal Health Information to Santa Clara via Santa Clara’s Website qualifies as a “communication” under the ECPA’s definition in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).

350. The transmissions of Plaintiffs’ Personal Health Information to medical professionals qualifies as a “communication” under the ECPA’s definition in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).

351. **Electronic Communications.** The transmission of Personal Health Information between Plaintiffs and Class Members and Santa Clara via its Website with which they chose to exchange communications are “transfer[s] of signs, signals, writing, ...data, [and] intelligence of [some] nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system that affects interstate commerce” and are therefore “electronic communications” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).

352. **Content.** The ECPA defines content, when used with respect to electronic communications, to “include[] *any* information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (emphasis added). Santa Clara aided in the interception and disclosure of “contents” including

- 1 (a) The parties to the communications;
- 2 (b) The precise text of patient search queries;
- 3 (c) Personally identifying information such as patients' IP addresses,
- 4 Facebook IDs, browser fingerprints, and other unique identifiers;
- 5 (d) The precise text of patient communications about specific doctors;
- 6 (e) The precise text of patient communications about specific medical
- 7 conditions;
- 8 (f) The precise text of patient communications about specific treatments;
- 9 (g) The precise text of patient communications about scheduling
- 10 appointments with medical providers;
- 11 (h) The precise text of patient communications about billing and payment;
- 12 (i) The precise text of specific buttons on Santa Clara's website(s) that
- 13 patients click to exchange communications, including Log-Ins,
- 14 Registrations, Requests for Appointments, Search, and other buttons;
- 15 (j) The precise dates and times when patients click to Log-In on Santa
- 16 Clara's website(s);
- 17 (k) The doctors that patients selected for review from drop down menus using
- 18 Santa Clara's website;
- 19 (l) The precise dates and times when patients visit Santa Clara's websites;
- 20 (m) Information that is a general summary or informs third parties of the
- 21 general subject of communications that Santa Clara sent back to patients
- 22 in response to search queries and requests for information about specific
- 23 doctors, conditions, treatments, billing, payment, and other information;
- 24 and
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(n) Any other content that Santa Clara has aided Facebook, Google, or other third parties in scraping from webpages or communication forms at its Web Properties.

353. **Interception.** The ECPA defines the interception as the “acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device” and “contents ... include any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4), (8).

354. **Electronic, Mechanical, or Other Device.** The ECPA defines “electronic, mechanical, or other device” as “any device ... which can be used to intercept a[n] ... electronic communication[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5). The following constitute “devices” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5):

- a. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ browsers;
- b. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ computing devices;
- c. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ mobile applications;
- d. Defendant’s computer servers; and
- e. The tracking pixels deployed by Defendant to effectuate the sending and acquisition of patient communications;
- f. Internet cookies; and
- g. Computer servers of third-parties to which Plaintiff’s and Class Members communications were disclosed.

355. Whenever Plaintiff and Class Members interacted with Defendant’s Website, Defendant, through the Tracking Pixel imbedded and ran on its Website, contemporaneously and intentionally disclosed, and endeavored to disclose the contents of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ electronic communications to third parties, including Facebook and Google, without authorization or consent, and knowing or having reason to know that the electronic communications were obtained in violation of the ECPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c).



1           356. Whenever Plaintiff and Class Members interacted with Defendant's Website,  
2 Defendant, through the Tracking Pixels deployed on its Website, contemporaneously and  
3 intentionally used, and endeavored to use the contents of Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
4 electronic communications, for purposes other than providing health care services to Plaintiff and  
5 Class Members without authorization or consent, and knowing or having reason to know that the  
6 electronic communications were obtained in violation of the ECPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d).

7           357. Whenever Plaintiff and Class Members interacted with Defendant's Website,  
8 Defendant, through the source code it deployed and ran on its web properties and mobile app,  
9 contemporaneously and intentionally redirected the contents of Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
10 electronic communications while those communications were in transmission, to persons or  
11 entities other than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication, including Facebook  
12 and Google.

13           358. Defendant's intercepted communications include, but are not limited to, the  
14 contents of communications to/from Plaintiff's and Class Members' regarding PII and PHI,  
15 treatment, medication, and scheduling.

16           359. By intentionally disclosing or endeavoring to disclose the electronic  
17 communications of Plaintiff and Class Members to affiliates and other third parties, while  
18 knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of  
19 an electronic communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), Defendant violated 18 U.S.C.  
20 § 2511(1)(c).

21           360. By intentionally using, or endeavoring to use, the contents of the electronic  
22 communications of Plaintiff and Class Members, while knowing or having reason to know that  
23 the information was obtained through the interception of an electronic communication in violation  
24 of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d).

1           361. Defendant intentionally used the wire or electronic communications for marketing  
2 purposes to increase its profit margins. Defendant specifically used the Pixels to track and utilize  
3 Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII and PHI for financial gain.

4           362. Defendant was not acting under color of law to intercept Plaintiff's and Class  
5 Members' wire or electronic communication.

6           363. Plaintiff and Class Members did not authorize Defendant to acquire the content of  
7 their communications for purposes of invading Plaintiff's privacy via the Pixel tracking code.

8           364. Any purported consent that Defendant received from Plaintiff and Class Members  
9 was not valid.

10           365. **Unauthorized Purpose.** Defendant intentionally intercepted the contents of  
11 Plaintiff's and Class Members' electronic communications for the purpose of committing a  
12 tortious or criminal act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State  
13 – namely, violations of California state law, including California Civil Code § 56.10 which  
14 prohibits a health care provider from disclosing medical information without first obtaining an  
15 authorization, California Civil Code § 1798.1 which prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of  
16 personal information such as IP addresses and Facebook IDs, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 which makes  
17 it a federal crime to disclose individually identifiable health information for commercial  
18 advantage, and invasion of privacy, among others.

19           366. The ECPA provides that a “party to the communication” may liable where a  
20 “communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in  
21 violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.” 18 U.S.C § 2511(2)(d).

22           367. Defendant is a “party to the communication” with respect to patient  
23 communications. However, Defendant's simultaneous, unknown duplication, forwarding, and  
24 interception of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Personal Health Information does not qualify for  
25 the party exemption.  
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368. Defendant's acquisition of patient communications that were used and disclosed to Facebook and Google was done for purposes of committing criminal and tortious acts in violation of the laws of the United States and California including, among other things,

- a. Criminal violation of HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6;
- b. Violations of California Civil Code § 56.10 and California Civil Code § 56.36 for unauthorized disclosure of medical information;
- c. Violation of California Civil Code § 56.101 which requires every health care provided to manage medical information in a manner that preserves the confidentiality of that information;
- d. Violation of California Civil Code § 1798.1 et seq. (the Information Privacy Act of 1977), including California Civil Code § 1798.57, for violating Plaintiff's and Class Member's right to privacy;
- e. Violation of California Government Code § 815.6 for violating mandatory privacy duties imposed by California law protecting California citizens against the unauthorized disclosure of their medical information;
- f. Violation California Civil Code § 1798.82 (the California Consumers Records Act) for Santa Clara's failure to notify its patients that it was regularly sharing their medical information with Facebook and Google;
- g. Violation of California Civil Code § 1798.100 which prohibits businesses from collecting and using personal information without properly disclosing those uses to the public; and
- h. Common law invasion of privacy.

369. For example, under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, it is a criminal violation for a person to "use[] or cause[] to be used a unique health identifier" or to "disclose[] individually identifiable health information to another person ... without authorization" from the patient.

1           370. The penalty for violation is enhanced where “the offense is committed with intent  
2 to sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage,  
3 personal gain, or malicious harm.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6.

4           371. Santa Clara’s conduct violated 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 in that it:

- 5                   a. Used and caused to be used cookie identifiers associated with specific  
6 patients without patient authorization; and
- 7                   b. Disclosed individually identifiable health information to Facebook and  
8 Google without patient authorization.

9           372. Defendant’s conduct would be subject to the enhanced provisions of 42 U.S.C.  
10 § 1320d-6 because Defendant’s use of the Facebook and Google source code was for Defendant’s  
11 commercial advantage to increase revenue from existing patients and gain new patients.

12           373. Under California Civil Code § 56.10 and California Civil Code § 56.36 a health  
13 care provider is prohibited from disclosing patients’ medical information without first obtaining  
14 authorization. Santa Clara violated Civil Code § 56.10 by disclosing Plaintiff’s and Class  
15 Members’ medical information to Facebook and Google without their consent, including  
16 information concerning their health status, medical diagnoses, treatment, and appointment  
17 information, as well as Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personally identifiable information.

18           374. Santa Clara further violated Civil Code § 56.10 by knowingly and without  
19 Plaintiff’s or Class Members’ authorization inserted the \_fbp, ga, and gid cookies on Plaintiff’s  
20 and Class Members’ computing devices. The Meta Pixel source code that Santa Clara deployed  
21 on its website is programmed to manipulate user’s browsers so that their communications with  
22 Santa Clara were automatically, contemporaneously, and surreptitiously sent to Facebook.  
23 Specifically, when Plaintiff and Class Members visited Defendant’s website for the first time, the  
24 Meta Pixel source code that Defendant had installed on its website instructed Plaintiff’s and Class  
25 Member’s browsers to begin sending duplicate GET and POST requests to Facebook every time  
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1 that Plaintiff and Class Members subsequently interacted with part of Defendant's website, such  
2 as browsing new pages, filling out forms, or enter entering search terms in a search box.

3 375. The `_fbp`, `ga`, and `gid` cookies that Santa Clara caused to be downloaded onto  
4 Plaintiff's and Class Members' browsers furthered this scheme to surreptitiously monitor,  
5 intercept, and disclose patients' communications by facilitating the identification and tracking of  
6 Plaintiff and Class Members web activity by Facebook and Google. Defendant knew or had  
7 reason to know that the `ga`, and `gid` cookies would compromise Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
8 computing devices by facilitating the transmission their personally identifying data and the  
9 content of their communications to Facebook, Google, and others.

10 376. Likewise, Santa Clara violated Civil Code § 56.101 in that it failed to maintain the  
11 confidentiality of its patients' medical information by intentionally deploying tracking  
12 technologies on its website and mobile app that shared patients' medical information with  
13 Facebook and Google.

14 377. Santa Clara further violated Civil Code §§ 1798.1 generally and 1798.57  
15 specifically by intentionally disclosing Plaintiff and Class Members' medical records "in violation  
16 of the disclosure provisions" of California Civil Code § 1798.1 *et seq.* which resulted in the both  
17 economic loss and personal injury to Plaintiff and Class Members.

18 378. Santa Clara further violated California Government Code § 815.6 by violating its  
19 mandatory duties under California law to protect its patients' medical information from  
20 unauthorized disclosures to third parties like Facebook and Google.

21 379. Defendant is not exempt from ECPA liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) on the  
22 ground that it was a participant in Plaintiffs' and Class Members' communications about their  
23 individually-identifiable patient health information on its Website, because it used its participation  
24 in these communications to improperly share Plaintiff's and Class Members' individually-  
25 identifiable patient health information with Facebook and Google, third-parties that did not  
26 participate in these communications, that Plaintiff and Class Members did not know were  
27

1 receiving their individually-identifiable patient health information, and that Plaintiff and Class  
2 Members did not consent to receive this information.

3 380. Defendant accessed, obtained, and disclosed Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
4 Personal Health Information for the purpose of committing the crimes and torts described herein  
5 because it would not have been able to obtain the information or the marketing services if it had  
6 complied with the law.

7 381. As such, Defendants cannot viably claim any exception to ECPA liability.

8 382. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered damages as a direct and proximate  
9 result of Defendant's invasion of privacy in that:

- 10 a. Learning that Defendant has intruded upon, intercepted, transmitted,  
11 shared, and used their individually-identifiable patient health information  
12 (including information about their medical symptoms, conditions, and  
13 concerns, medical appointments, healthcare providers and locations,  
14 medications and treatments, and health insurance and medical bills) for  
15 commercial purposes has caused Plaintiff and the Class Members to suffer  
16 emotional distress;
- 17 b. Defendant received substantial financial benefits from its use of Plaintiff's  
18 and Class Members' individually-identifiable patient health information  
19 without providing any value or benefit to Plaintiff or the Class Members;
- 20 c. Defendant received substantial, quantifiable value from its use of  
21 Plaintiff's and Class Members' individually-identifiable patient health  
22 information, such as understanding how people use its website and  
23 determining what ads people see on its website, without providing any  
24 value or benefit to Plaintiff or the Class Members;

- 1 d. Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff and the Class Members with the full  
2 value of the medical services for which they paid, which included a duty to  
3 maintain the confidentiality of their patient information; and  
4 e. The diminution in value of Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII and PHI and  
5 the loss of privacy due to Defendant making sensitive and confidential  
6 information, such as patient status, test results, and appointments that  
7 Plaintiff and Class Members intended to remain private no longer private.

8 383. Plaintiff and Class Members have also suffered irreparable injury from  
9 Defendants' unauthorized acts of interception and disclosure. Their personal, private, and  
10 sensitive data has been collected, viewed, accessed, stored, and used by Santa Clara and Facebook  
11 without their consent and has not been destroyed. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered harm  
12 and injury, including but not limited to the invasion of their privacy rights. Plaintiff continues to  
13 desire to search for health information on Santa Clara's website. Plaintiff will continue to suffer  
14 harm if the website is not redesigned. If the website were redesigned to comply with applicable  
15 laws, Plaintiff would use the Santa Clara's website to search for health information in the future.  
16 Due to the continuing threat of injury, Plaintiff and Class Members have no adequate remedy at  
17 law, and Plaintiff and Class Members are therefore entitled to injunctive relief.

18 384. As a result of Defendant's violation of the ECPA, Plaintiff and Class Members  
19 entitled to all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2520, including statutory damages of  
20 whichever is the greater of \$100 a day for each day of violation or \$10,000, equitable or  
21 declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs. Based on  
22 the size of the anticipated class of Santa Clara patients (which numbers in the many thousands),  
23 damages are expected to be over the mandatory arbitration threshold of \$150,000.

24 385. Plaintiff and Class Members also seek such other relief as the Court may deem  
25 equitable, legal, and proper.  
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**COUNT II—VIOLATION OF CMIA CIVIL CODE § 56.101**

386. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs.

387. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and all members of the Patient Subclass against Santa Clara Valley Medical Center.

388. Civil Code § 56.101, subdivision (a) requires that every provider of health care “who creates, maintains, preserves, stores, abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical information shall do so in a manner that preserves the confidentiality of the information contained therein.”

389. Any health care provider who “negligently creates, maintains, preserves, stores, abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical information shall be subject to the remedies and penalties provided under subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 56.36.”

390. Santa Clara failed to maintain, preserve, and store medical information in a manner that preserves the confidentiality of the information contained therein because it disclosed to Facebook Plaintiff’s and Subclass Members’ sensitive medical information without consent, including information concerning their health status, medical diagnoses, treatment, and appointment information, as well as personally identifiable information.

391. Santa Clara’s failure to maintain, preserve, and store medical information in a manner that preserves the confidentiality of the information was, at the least, negligent and violates Civil Code § 56.36 subdivisions (b) and (c).

392. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Subclass Members may recover: (1) nominal damages of \$1,000; (2) actual damages, in an amount to be determined at trial; (3) statutory damages pursuant to 56.36(c); and (4) reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.

393. In addition to statutory damages, Santa Clara’s breach caused Plaintiff and Subclass Members, at minimum, the following damages:

- (a) Sensitive and confidential information that Plaintiff and Subclass Members intended to remain private is no longer private;



(a) Santa Clara eroded the essential confidential nature of the doctor-patient relationship;

(b) Santa Clara took something of value from Plaintiff and Subclass Members and derived benefit therefrom without Plaintiff's and Subclass Members' knowledge or informed consent and without sharing the benefit of such value;

(c) Plaintiff and Subclass Members did not get the full value of the medical services for which they paid, which included Santa Clara's duty to maintain confidentiality; and

(d) Santa Clara's actions diminished the value of Plaintiff and Subclass Members' personal information.

394. Plaintiff and Subclass Members also seek such other relief as the Court may deem equitable, legal, and proper.

### **COUNT III—VIOLATION OF CMIA CIVIL CODE § 56.10**

395. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs.

396. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and all members of the Patient Subclass against Santa Clara Valley Medical Center.

397. Civil Code § 56.10, subdivision (a), prohibits a health care provider from disclosing medical information without first obtaining an authorization, unless a statutory exception applies.

398. Santa Clara disclosed medical information without first obtaining authorization when it disclosed Plaintiff's and Subclass Members' sensitive medical information to Facebook without consent, including information concerning their health status, medical diagnoses, treatment, and appointment information, as well as personally identifiable information. No statutory exception applies. As a result, Santa Clara violated Civil Code § 56.10, subdivision (a).

1           399. Santa Clara knowingly and willfully, or negligently, disclosed medical information  
2 without consent to Facebook for financial gain.

3           400. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Subclass Members may recover: (1) nominal damages  
4 of \$1,000; (2) actual damages, in an amount to be determined at trial; (3) statutory damages  
5 pursuant to 56.36(c); (4) punitive damages pursuant to 56.35; and (5) reasonable attorney's fees  
6 and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.

7           401. In addition to statutory damages, Santa Clara's breach caused Plaintiff and  
8 Subclass Members, at minimum, the following damages:

- 9           (a) Sensitive and confidential information that Plaintiff and Subclass Members  
10 intended to remain private is no longer private;
- 11           (b) Santa Clara eroded the essential confidential nature of the doctor-patient  
12 relationship;
- 13           (c) Santa Clara took something of value from Plaintiff and Subclass Members  
14 and derived benefit therefrom without Plaintiff's and Subclass Members'  
15 knowledge or informed consent and without sharing the benefit of such  
16 value;
- 17           (d) Plaintiff and Subclass Members did not get the full value of the medical  
18 services for which they paid, which included Santa Clara's duty to maintain  
19 confidentiality; and
- 20           (e) Santa Clara's actions diminished the value of Plaintiff's and Subclass  
21 Members' personal information.

22           402. Plaintiff and Subclass Members also seek such other relief as the Court may deem  
23 equitable, legal, and proper.

24                           **COUNT IV—VIOLATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE**  
25                           **COMPUTER DATA ACCESS AND FRAUD ACT**  
26                           **(“CDAFA”) CAL. PENAL CODE § 502**

27           403. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs.  
28

1           404. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and all members of the Santa Clara  
2 Valley Medical Center Class against Defendants.

3           405. The California Legislature enacted the Comprehensive Computer Data Access and  
4 Fraud Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (“CDAFA”) to “expand the degree of protection . . . from  
5 tampering, interference, damage, and unauthorized access to [including the extraction of data  
6 from] lawfully created computer data and computer systems,” finding and declaring that “the  
7 proliferation of computer technology has resulted in a concomitant proliferation of . . . forms of  
8 unauthorized access to computers, computer systems, and computer data,” and that “protection of  
9 the integrity of all types and forms of lawfully created computers, computer systems, and  
10 computer data is vital to the protection of the privacy of individuals . . .” CAL. PENAL CODE  
11 § 502(a).

12           406. Under CDAFA, any person who “[k]nowingly accesses and without permission ...  
13 *uses* any data ... or computer system in order to either (A) devise or execute any scheme or artifice  
14 to defraud, deceive, or extort, or (B) wrongfully control or obtain money, property, or data” is  
15 “guilty of a public offense.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(1).

16           407. Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ devices on which they accessed the hospital or  
17 patient portals, including their computers, smart phones, and tablets, constitute computers or  
18 “computer systems” within the meaning of CDAFA. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(b)(5).

19           408. Defendants violated section 502, subsection (c)(1)(A) by knowingly using data  
20 obtained from Santa Clara’s patients as part of a scheme to defraud and deceive patients into  
21 surrendering their Personal Health Information so that Santa Clara could then barter that  
22 information to Facebook in return for economic benefits. Defendants violated section 502,  
23 subsection (c)(1)(B) by knowingly using data obtained from Santa Clara’s patients to wrongfully  
24 obtain financial and other benefits. Santa Clara obtained benefits from Facebook, as well as  
25 Google and other third parties, by bartering patients’ Personal Health Information to those  
26 companies. Facebook obtained benefits by using Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ information  
27

1 to sell targeted advertisements. Neither Plaintiff nor Class Members ever gave Defendants  
2 permission for Santa Clara to disclose their Personal Health Information to Facebook or any other  
3 third party.

4 409. Defendants also violated section 502, subsection (c)(1)(B), of CDAFA by  
5 knowingly accessing without permission Plaintiff's and Class Members' devices in order to  
6 wrongfully obtain and use their personal data, including their sensitive medical information, in  
7 violation of Plaintiff's and Class Members' reasonable expectations of privacy in their devices  
8 and data. Defendants achieved this by installing software code on Santa Clara's website that  
9 directed patients' browsers to send copies of their communications to Facebook, as well as Google  
10 and other third parties, without their consent. Defendants also placed the `_fbp`, `_ga`, and `_gid`  
11 cookies on Class Members' computing devices without consent. These cookies occupied storage  
12 space on Plaintiff's and Class Members' devices and used the resources of those devices without  
13 authorization, usurping the devices' normal functions and re-directing them toward sending  
14 unauthorized communications.

15 410. The Meta Pixel source code that Santa Clara deployed on its website is  
16 programmed to manipulate user's browsers so that their communications with Santa Clara were  
17 automatically, contemporaneously, and surreptitiously sent to Facebook. Specifically, when  
18 Plaintiff and Class Members visited Defendant's website for the first time, the Meta Pixel source  
19 code that Defendant had installed on its website instructed Plaintiff's and Class Member's  
20 browsers to begin sending duplicate GET and POST requests to Facebook every time that Plaintiff  
21 and Class Members subsequently interacted with part of Defendant's website, such as browsing  
22 new pages, filling out forms, or enter entering search terms in a search box. These surreptitious  
23 instructions harmed Plaintiff's and Class Members' computing devices by causing them to run  
24 slower.

25 411. The `_fbp`, `ga`, and `gid` cookies that Santa Clara caused to be downloaded onto  
26 Plaintiff's and Class Members' browsers furthered this scheme to surreptitiously monitor,  
27

1 intercept, and disclose patients' communications by facilitating the identification and tracking of  
2 Plaintiff and Class Members web activity by Facebook and Google. Defendant knew or had  
3 reason to know that the ga, and gid cookies would compromise Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
4 computing devices by facilitating the transmission their personally identifying data and the  
5 content of their communications to Facebook, Google, and others and taking up unnecessary  
6 space on Plaintiff's and Class Members' hard drives with data that only served to benefit Santa  
7 Clara, Facebook, and Google—not Plaintiff or Class Members.

8 412. Defendants violated California Penal Code section 502, subsection (c)(2), by  
9 knowingly and without permission accessing, taking, copying, and making use of Plaintiff's and  
10 the Class Members' personally identifiable information, including their sensitive medical  
11 information as part of a scheme. Santa Clara sought to barter patients' Personal Health  
12 Information to Facebook, as well as Google and other third parties, in return for advertising  
13 benefits, and Facebook sought to exploit Plaintiff's and Class Members' Personal Health  
14 Information to sell targeted advertising services

15 413. Santa Clara violated California Penal Code section 502, subsection (c)(6) by  
16 knowingly and without permission providing or assisting Facebook, as well as Google and other  
17 third parties, with a means of accessing Plaintiff's and the Class Members' computer systems.

18 414. The computers and mobile devices that Plaintiff and Class Members used when  
19 accessing Santa Clara's website all have and operate "computer services" within the meaning of  
20 CDAFA. Defendants violated §§ 502(c)(3) and (7) of CDAFA by knowingly and without  
21 permission accessing and using those devices and computer services, and/or causing them to be  
22 accessed and used, *inter alia*, in connection with Facebook's wrongful collection of such data.

23 415. Under § 502(b)(12) of the CDAFA a "Computer contaminant" is defined as "any  
24 set of computer instructions that are designed to . . . record, or transmit information within a  
25 computer, computer system, or computer network without the intent or permission of the owner  
26 of the information." Defendants violated § 502(c)(8) by knowingly and without permission  
27

1 introducing a computer contaminant via Meta Pixel embedded into the hospital website which  
2 intercepted Plaintiff's and the Class Members' private and sensitive medical information.

3 416. Defendants' breach caused Plaintiff and Class Members, at minimum, the  
4 following damages:

- 5 (a) Sensitive and confidential information that Plaintiff and Class Members  
6 intended to remain private is no longer private;
- 7 (b) Plaintiff's and Class Members' computers had less available storage space  
8 than they normally would have;
- 9 (c) Plaintiff's and Class Members' computers worked more slowly than they  
10 normally would have;
- 11 (d) Plaintiff and Class Members were forced to spend time and money to  
12 investigate and mitigate the contamination of their computing devices by  
13 Santa Clara;
- 14 (e) Defendants eroded the essential confidential nature of the doctor-patient  
15 relationship;
- 16 (f) Defendants took something of value from Plaintiff and Class Members and  
17 derived benefit therefrom without Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
18 knowledge or informed consent and without sharing the benefit of such  
19 value;
- 20 (g) Plaintiff and Class Members did not get the full value of the medical  
21 services for which they paid, which included Santa Clara's duty to maintain  
22 confidentiality; and
- 23 (h) Defendants' actions diminished the value of Plaintiff and Class Members'  
24 personal information.

25 417. Plaintiff and Class Members also seek such other relief as the Court may deem  
26 equitable, legal, and proper.

1           418. Plaintiff and the Class Members seek compensatory damages in accordance with  
2 CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(1), in an amount to be proved at trial, and injunctive or other equitable  
3 relief. Plaintiff continues to desire to search for health information on Santa Clara’s website. She  
4 will continue to suffer harm if the website is not redesigned. If the website were redesigned to  
5 comply with applicable laws, Plaintiff would use Santa Clara’s website to search for health  
6 information in the future.

7           419. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to punitive or exemplary damages  
8 pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(4) because Defendants’ violations were willful and  
9 Defendants are guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice as defined in CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3294.

10           420. Plaintiff and the Class Members are also entitled to recover their reasonable  
11 attorney’s fees under § 502(e)(2).

12                           **COUNT V—VIOLATION OF CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.82**

13           421. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs.

14           422. Plaintiff Jane Doe brings this claim on behalf of herself and all members of the  
15 Patient Subclass against Santa Clara Valley Medical Center.

16           423. California Civil Code § 1798.82(a) provides that “[a] person or business that  
17 conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses computerized data that includes  
18 personal information, shall disclose a breach of the security of the system following discovery or  
19 notification of the breach in the security of the data to a resident of California ... whose  
20 unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an  
21 unauthorized person.”

22           424. For purposes of the statute, “personal information” means “[a]n individual’s first  
23 name or first initial and last name in combination with any one or more of the following data  
24 elements, when either the name or the data elements are not encrypted: ... (D) Medical  
25 information.” CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.82.

1           425. For purposes of the statute, “medical information” means “any information  
2 regarding an individual's medical history, mental or physical condition, or medical treatment or  
3 diagnosis by a health care professional.”

4           426. Any customer who is injured by a violation of the statute may institute a civil action  
5 to recover damages. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.84(b). Further, any business that violates, proposes  
6 to violate, or has violated this statute may be enjoined. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(e).

7           427. Santa Clara failed to disclose to Plaintiff and the Subclass that it was regularly  
8 collecting, transmitting, and sharing patients’ unencrypted medical information with Facebook so  
9 that Facebook could target them with advertising. Along with its patients’ medical information,  
10 Santa Clara also disclosed its patients’ first names (or first initial and last name) to Facebook via  
11 encrypted data transmissions, including the unauthorized transmission of patients’ Facebook IDs  
12 to Facebook, which permitted Facebook to link the medical information provided with the  
13 personal identities of Plaintiff and the Subclass Members.

14           428. Santa Clara willfully, intentionally, and/or recklessly failed to provide the  
15 disclosures required by California Civil Code section 1798.82 as part of a scheme to barter  
16 Plaintiff’s and Subclass Members’ Personal Health Information to Facebook in return for access  
17 to the Meta Pixel tool.

18           429. Plaintiff and Subclass Members conferred a benefit on Santa Clara in the form of  
19 valuable sensitive medical information that Santa Clara collected from Plaintiff and Subclass  
20 Members under the guise of keeping this information private. Santa Clara collected, used, and  
21 disclosed this information for its own gain, including for advertising purposes, sale, or trade for  
22 valuable services from Facebook and other third parties. Santa Clara had knowledge that Plaintiff  
23 and Subclass Members had conferred this benefit on Santa Clara by interacting with its website,  
24 and Santa Clara intentionally installed the Meta Pixel tool on its website to capture and monetize  
25 this benefit conferred by Plaintiff and Subclass Members.



1           430. Plaintiff and Subclass Members also conferred a benefit on Defendant by paying  
2 Santa Clara for health care services, which included Santa Clara's obligation to protect Plaintiff's  
3 and Subclass Members' Personal Health Information. Santa Clara was aware of receiving these  
4 payments from Plaintiff and Subclass Members and demanded such payments as a condition of  
5 providing treatment.

6           431. Plaintiff and Subclass Members would not have used the Santa Clara's services,  
7 or would have paid less for those services, if they had known that Santa Clara would collect, use,  
8 and disclose this information to Facebook. The services that Plaintiff and Subclass Members  
9 ultimately received in exchange for the monies paid to Santa Clara were worth quantifiably less  
10 than the services that Santa Clara promised to provide.

11           432. The medical services that Santa Clara offers are available from many other health  
12 care systems who do protect the confidentiality of patient communications. Had Santa Clara  
13 disclosed that it would allow third parties to secretly collect Plaintiff's and Subclass Members'  
14 medical information without consent, neither Plaintiff, the Subclass Members, nor any reasonable  
15 person would have purchased healthcare from Santa Clara and/or its affiliated healthcare  
16 providers.

17           433. Santa Clara unjustly retained those benefits at the expense of Plaintiff and Subclass  
18 Members because Santa Clara's conduct damaged Plaintiff and Subclass Members, all without  
19 providing any commensurate compensation to Plaintiff and Subclass Members.

20           434. Plaintiff and Patient Subclass Members were damaged by Santa Clara's failure to  
21 inform them that their Personal Health Information was being shared with Facebook and other  
22 third parties, resulting in, at minimum, the following damages:

- 23           (i) Sensitive and confidential information that Plaintiff and Patient Subclass  
24 Members intended to remain private is no longer private;  
25           (j) Santa Clara eroded the essential confidential nature of the doctor-patient  
26 relationship;  
27

1 (k) Santa Clara took something of value from Plaintiff and Patient Subclass  
2 Members and derived benefit therefrom without Plaintiff's and Patient  
3 Subclass Members' knowledge or informed consent and without sharing  
4 the benefit of such value;

5 (l) Plaintiff and Patient Subclass Members did not get the full value of the  
6 medical services for which they paid, which included Santa Clara's duty to  
7 maintain confidentiality; and

8 (m) Santa Clara's actions diminished the value of Plaintiff and Patient Subclass  
9 Members' personal information.

10 435. Plaintiff also continues to desire to search for health information on Santa Clara's  
11 website. She will continue to suffer harm if Santa Clara does not make adequate disclosures  
12 regarding which third party marketing companies are receiving Plaintiff's and Patient Subclass  
13 Members' protected health information. Plaintiff and the Patient Subclass Members are therefore  
14 also entitled to injunctive relief requiring Santa Clara to comply with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82.

15 **COUNT VI – VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE § 815.6**

16 436. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully  
17 set forth here and brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Santa Clara Valley Medical  
18 Center Class against Defendants.

19 437. Pursuant to California Government Code § 815.6, when a public entity like Santa  
20 Clara is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the  
21 risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is "liable for an injury of that kind proximately  
22 caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised  
23 reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.

24 438. As set forth in the paragraphs above, Santa Clara was subject to at least the  
25 following mandatory duties provided by California and Federal law:  
26  
27  
28

- a. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, which imposes mandatory duties prohibiting healthcare providers from sharing patients’ protected health information for commercial gain;
- b. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 which imposes mandatory duties prohibiting health care providers like Santa Clara from using or disclosing protected health information without an a valid authorization;
- c. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 which imposes mandatory duties prohibiting healthcare providers from disclosing protected health information without authorization if the healthcare provider “directly or indirectly receives remuneration from or on behalf of the recipient of the protected health information in exchange for the protected health information”;
- d. California Civil Code § 56.10 which imposes mandatory duties prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of medical information;
- e. California Civil Code § 56.101 which imposes mandatory duties requiring every health care provided to manage medical information in a manner that preserves the confidentiality of that information;
- f. California Civil Code § 1798.1 et seq. (the Information Privacy Act of 1977), including California Civil § 1798.21 which imposes a mandatory duty for “each agency to establish appropriate and reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure compliance with the provisions of this chapter, to ensure the security and confidentiality of records, and to protect against anticipated threats or hazards to their security or integrity which could result in any injury” and California Civil Code § 1798.24 which imposes a mandatory duty that an agency “shall not shall not disclose any personal information in a manner that would link the information disclosed to the individual to whom it

pertains” unless it has provided notice and obtained “written voluntary consent” of the individual to whom the information pertains.”

- g. California Civil Code § 1798.82 (the California Consumers Records Act) which imposes a mandatory duty for a business in California to disclose breaches of its security system following the discovery that unauthorized persons have received a California resident’s personal information; and
- h. California Civil Code § 1798.100 which prohibits businesses from collecting and using personal information without properly disclosing those uses to the public;
- i. California Civil Code §§ 1709 and 1710 which impose mandatory duties to refrain from willfully deceiving others with the intent to induce them to alter their position to their injury or risk; and
- j. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. which imposes a mandatory duty for entities like Santa Clara to refrain from intercepting, using, or disclosing individuals’ communications without consent where the interceptions were made for the purpose of committing a crime or tort in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.

439. Plaintiff and Class Members had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications with Santa Clara via its website and the communications platforms and services therein.

440. Plaintiff and Class Members communicated sensitive and protected medical information and personally identifiable information that they intended for only Santa Clara to receive and that they believed Santa Clara would keep private. Defendants deployed source code on Santa Clara’s website that surreptitiously instructed Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ browsers to share their Personal Health Information with Facebook, as well as Google and other third parties.

1           441. Santa Clara's disclosure of the substance and nature of those communications to  
2 third parties without the knowledge and consent of Plaintiff and Class Members is an intentional  
3 intrusion on Plaintiff's and Class Members' privacy.

4           442. Santa Clara interfered with Plaintiff's and Class Members' privacy rights when  
5 they implemented technology that surreptitiously tracked, recorded, and disclosed Plaintiff's and  
6 Class Members' confidential information to Facebook, Google, and other third parties.

7           443. Santa Clara also interfered with Plaintiff's and Class Members' rights when it  
8 intentionally deceived them about what it would do with their medical information by making  
9 misleading disclosures to the public on its website, including suppressing the fact that it had  
10 deployed tracking technologies on its website that shared patients' data with Facebook and  
11 Google and making promises that it would protect patient privacy without any intention of  
12 performing those promises.

13           444. Santa Clara also breached its obligations to patients in multiple other ways,  
14 including (1) failing to obtain their consent to disclose their private information to Facebook and  
15 other third parties, (2) failing to adequately review its marketing programs and web-based  
16 technology to ensure its website was safe and secure, (3) failing to remove or disengage software  
17 code that was known and designed to share patients' private information with third parties,  
18 (4) failing to take steps to block the transmission of Plaintiff's and Class Members' private  
19 information to Facebook and other third-party advertising companies, (5) failing to warn Plaintiff  
20 and Class Members that Defendants were routinely bartering their private information to  
21 Facebook via the Meta Pixel, and (6) otherwise ignoring Defendants' common-law and statutory  
22 obligations to protect the confidentiality of patient's protected health information.

23           445. Santa Clara further failed to maintain, preserve, and store medical information in  
24 a manner that preserves the confidentiality of the information contained therein because it  
25 disclosed to Facebook and Google Plaintiffs' and Class Members' sensitive medical information  
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1 without consent, including information concerning their health status, medical diagnoses,  
2 treatment, and appointment information, as well as personally identifiable information.

3 446. Defendants' failure to maintain, preserve, and store medical information in a  
4 manner that preserves the confidentiality of the information was, at the least, negligent and  
5 violates the mandatory duties imposed by Civil Code section 56.101.

6 447. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered injury because of Defendants' conduct.  
7 Their injuries include invasion of privacy, overpayment for medical services, loss of the value of  
8 their personal information, and the continued and ongoing risk of irreparable harm from the  
9 disclosure of their most sensitive and personal information

10 448. Plaintiff and Class Members had a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the  
11 sensitive nature of their communications. Plaintiff and Class Members have a general expectation  
12 that their communications regarding health and finances will be kept confidential. Santa Clara's  
13 disclosure of Private Information and Facebooks interception of that information coupled with  
14 individually identifying information is highly offensive to the reasonable person.

15 449. Plaintiff and Class Members also had a reasonable expectation of privacy that their  
16 communications, identity, health information, and treatment data would remain confidential and  
17 that Defendant would not install surreptitious wiretapping technology on Santa Clara's website to  
18 secretly transmit their communications to third parties, including Facebook, as well as Google  
19 and other third parties.

20 450. As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered  
21 harm and injury, including the specific harms that the mandatory duties set forth above were  
22 designed to prevent. Among other things, as a consequence of Santa Clara's failure to comply  
23 with its mandatory duties, (1) Plaintiff's and Class Members' medical information was disclosed  
24 to Facebook and Google without their consent; (2) Plaintiff's and Class Members' protected  
25 health information was exploited for commercial gain without their consent; (3) Plaintiff's and  
26 Class Members' privacy continued to be violated long after Santa Clara became aware of the  
27

1 unauthorized disclosures caused by tracking technologies because Santa Clara refused to provide  
 2 notice of the data breach that its deployment of these tracking technologies had caused; (4)  
 3 Plaintiff and Class Member's had their protected health information disclosed to third parties  
 4 because Santa Clara failed to take reasonable measures to protect that information against  
 5 unlawful disclosure; and (5) Plaintiff and Class Members were tricked into providing their  
 6 protected health information to Facebook and Google because Santa Clara failed to provide  
 7 legally mandated notice that it would share patients' medical information with third parties via  
 8 tracking technologies it had deployed on its website and mobile app.

9 451. Plaintiff and Class Members have been damaged as a direct and proximate result  
 10 of Defendants' invasion of their privacy and are entitled to just compensation, including monetary  
 11 damages.

12 452. Plaintiff and Class Members seek appropriate relief for that injury, including but  
 13 not limited to damages that will reasonably compensate Plaintiff and Class Members for the harm  
 14 to their privacy interests as a result of its intrusions upon Plaintiff's and Class Members' privacy.

15 453. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to punitive damages resulting from  
 16 the malicious, willful, and intentional nature of Defendants' actions, directed at injuring Plaintiff  
 17 and Class Members in conscious disregard of their rights. Such damages are needed to deter  
 18 Defendants from engaging in such conduct in the future.

19 454. Plaintiff also seeks such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

20 **COUNT VII – VIOLATION OF THE INFORMATION**  
 21 **PRACTICES ACT CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.1, ET SEQ. (IPA)**

22 455. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully  
 23 set forth here and brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Santa Clara Valley Medical  
 24 Center Class against Santa Clara.

25 456. Plaintiff and Class Members are "individuals" under Civil Code section 1798.3(d).

26 457. Santa Clara is an "agency" as defined under Civil Code section 1798.3(b).  
 27  
 28

1           458. The patient data collected and transmitted to third parties by Santa Clara  
2 constitutes “record(s)” and a “system of records” as those terms are defined by section 1798.3(g)  
3 and (h).

4           459. The personal health information and personally identifiable information disclosed  
5 by Santa Clara’s unauthorized disclosures of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ data such as their  
6 names, addresses, telephone numbers, Facebook IDs, IP addresses, medical information, and  
7 other information constitutes “personal information” under section 1798.3(a) of the Civil Code.  
8 Santa Clara disclosed this personal information in violation of Civil Code section 1798.24 by  
9 failing to adequately secure and maintain it, thereby allowing unauthorized third parties to access  
10 and obtain it.

11           460. In violation of Civil Code section 1798.21, Santa Clara failed to establish  
12 appropriate and reasonable safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of Plaintiff’s and  
13 Class Members’ personal information, and to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of such  
14 personal information.

15           461. On information and belief, Santa Clara violated Civil Code section 1798.19 by  
16 failing to cause contractors and subcontractors to abide by the requirements of the Information  
17 Act of 1977 when entering contracts for the operation and maintenance of records containing  
18 Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal information.

19           462. In violation of Civil Code section 1798.20, Santa Clara failed to establish rules of  
20 conduct for persons involved in the design, development, operation, disclosure, or maintenance  
21 of records containing Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal information that effectively  
22 prohibited such persons from implementing technologies that would surreptitiously transmit  
23 patients’ personal information to third parties like Facebook and Google.

24           463. In violation of Civil Code section 1798.24, Santa Clara knowingly disclosed  
25 Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal information in a manner that would link the disclosed  
26 information to Plaintiff and Class Members without disclosing the same to Plaintiff and Class  
27



1 Members and without securing the prior written voluntary consent of Plaintiff and Class  
2 Members.

3 464. In violation of Civil Code section 1798.29, Santa Clara unreasonably delayed in  
4 disclosing its unauthorized disclosure of its patients' personal information to Facebook, as well  
5 as Google and other third parties. Santa Clara was aware of the unauthorized disclosure of its  
6 patients' personal information as early as 2022, and certainly no later than June 2023, but declined  
7 to inform the public. There were no legitimate needs justifying the delay. Nor was the delay  
8 necessary to determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of Santa Clara's  
9 data system.

10 465. Civil Code section 1798.45 permits Plaintiff and Class Members to bring a civil  
11 action against Santa Clara for violating the IPA. Santa Clara's failure to adhere to the requirement  
12 of the IPA has adversely affected Plaintiff's and Class Members' interests, including by denying  
13 them an opportunity to take timely and appropriate protective measures in response to Santa  
14 Clara's unauthorized disclosure of their personal information to Facebook, as well as Google and  
15 other third parties, such as choosing a different medical provider. In addition, as a result of Santa  
16 Clara's actions, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered (and will continue to suffer) economic  
17 damages and other injuries and actual harm including, without limitation: (1) the compromise and  
18 theft of their personal information; (2) loss of the opportunity to control how their personal  
19 information is used; (3) diminution in the value and use of their personal information entrusted to  
20 Santa Clara with the understanding that Santa Clara would safeguard it against theft and not allow  
21 it to be accessed and misused by third parties; (4) out-of-pocket costs associated with the  
22 prevention and detection of, and recovery from, identity theft and misuse of their personal  
23 information; (5) continued undue risk to their personal information; and (6) future costs in the  
24 form of time, effort, and money they will expend to prevent, detect, contest, and repair the adverse  
25 effects of their personal information being disclosed without authorization to Facebook, Google,  
26 and other third parties.

1           466. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to actual and statutory  
 2 damages from Santa Clara under Civil Code sections 1795, 1798.48, and 1798.53 in an amount  
 3 to be determined at trial, as well as injunctive relief pursuant to Civil Code section 1798.47,  
 4 reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and any other relief deemed appropriate by the Court.

#### 5                                   **IX. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

6           467. Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

#### 7                                   **X. PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

8           WHEREFORE, Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the proposed Class and Subclass  
 9 respectfully requests that the Court enter an order:  
 10

- 11           A.     Certifying the Class and Subclass and appointing Plaintiff as the Class and  
                 Subclass representative;
- 12           B.     Appointing the law firms of Ahmad, Zavitsanos, & Mensing PLLC and Caddell  
                 & Chapman as proposed interim class counsel;
- 13           C.     Finding that Defendants' conduct was unlawful, as alleged herein;
- 14           D.     Awarding such injunctive and other equitable relief as the Court deems just and  
                 proper;
- 15           E.     Awarding Plaintiff and the Class Members statutory, actual, compensatory,  
                 consequential, punitive, and nominal damages, as well as restitution and/or  
                 disgorgement of profits unlawfully obtained;
- 16           F.     Awarding Plaintiff and the Class Members pre-judgment and post-judgment  
                 interest;
- 17           G.     Awarding Plaintiff and the Class Members reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and  
                 expenses; and
- 18           H.     Granting such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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1 Dated July 29, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

2 By: /s/ Michael A. Caddell

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21 \* Motions for Admission to be filed

22 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on July 29, 2024, this document was electronically filed via the Court's CM/ECF system and will be served on all counsel of record.

*s/Michael A. Caddell*

Michael A. Caddell